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INTRODUCTION
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The continuing evolution of Internet brings with it modern ways of communication and
transformation of different aspects of the life. Today the Internet gives a large space for
exchanging the information and is a perfect carrier of information. This information may
be in the form of images, videos, and audios. These media may be used to hide some
information to transmit through the Internet. In some times the Internet users need to
send or receive specific data. The transmitted information must be sometime understood
only by the concerned persons. The increasing number of Internet users has naturally led
to the unauthorized access to the online information, where unauthorized access of data
has crossed the limits and confidential data has been penetrated. Until now, communi-
cation of secret data is a sensitive factor in information technology domain that continues
to create a difficult challenge with growing levels of sophistication. In order to hide a
secret message into a cover object, the cover object must contain an amount of noise
or redundant data that is used by the embedding process to conceal secret messages.
Images are considered as the most popular cover object that can be used in the domain
of information hiding. The image is a set of numbers that represent different light intensi-
ties in a view, where the noise and redundant data are used to hide a secret information.
One of the important topics that deals with the techniques of hiding information is the
steganography field.
The word steganography comes from the Greek words ”stegano” and ”graphein”. The
word ”stegano” means covered or concealed while the word ”graphein” means writing.
Steganography is the art of covering up hidden messages into innocent like host con-
tents as images. It has known numerous developments this last decade. The embedding
process in a steganography technique basically starts by identifying bits that can be mod-
ified without creating too much obvious artifacts in cover media. These bits are then
interchanged with the bits of the message to hide in a way that keeps media distortion
minimal. The rule of steganography systems is the practice of embedding a secret mes-
sage during communication in a way that no one except the recipient knows the existence
of a message. A usual rule of thumb when designing such steganography algorithm is
to follow the so-called Kerckhoffs’s principle which is usually interpreted in the informa-
tion hiding context as follows: the secret of the message must not lay on the secret of
the algorithm (which must be publicly released), but on a secret key. In other words, the
knowledge of the used steganography system should not give any information about the
presence of the embedding message. Following this rule, many steganography methods
have been proposed the last decades. However, steganography methods necessarily
modify statistical properties of images, and these unnatural distortions may be captured.
Tools attempting to separate original contents from media with hidden message, further
denoted as stego, are thus designed to work against digital steganography. These tools
specifically designed for cover images are called steganalyzers. Recent developments in
13
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steganalysis have emphasized the research community to come up with novel steganog-
raphy methods able to resist against a broad range of attacks on the cover media. Even-
tually, using all the pixels of an image to embed information is not a good idea because
some modifications are obviously more detectable than others. For instance, a slight al-
teration in a uniformly colored area can be easily detected. The same assumption is not
necessarily guaranteed when the alteration is located in the outline of a shape. Up-to-date
steganographiers start by computing a map of pixels with low distortion cost. The way
to build such a map is a key element in building steganographiers able to face steganal-
ysers. Conversely, steganalysers have to deal with this new generation of information
hiding techniques, by investigating which kind of image descriptors are able to signal an
unusual, artificial modification of an image content.
MOTIVATION OF THE DISSERTATION
The fields of steganography and steganalysis are becoming more and more important
in the digital world, where the information is easily exchanged through the Internet. The
ongoing requests of new methods to conceal a natural demand to preserve user privacy
on the one hand, and conversely to be able to monitor activity of individuals suspected to
perpetrate condemnable actions up to terrorism on the other hand, lead to a real need of
new studies in the field of both steganography and steganalysis. Indeed, the domains of
steganography and steganalysis are like a game between two teams. One of the team
tries to find the possible way to embed a secret message in the cover object with the
minimum artifacts on the cover object. This desire leads to the detection of the most noisy
areas in cover images, to discreetly embed a secret message in it. In the opposite side,
steganalysis systems try to detect any flaws in steganography systems, which may lead
to a kind of signature in the host content, which can be detected by tools like ensemble
classifiers working on extracted features.
Today, many algorithms have appeared in these two fields of information hiding, and a
global critical look on the proposals is now possible. In particular, it becomes appropriate
to make the competition fairer and more close to the reality life, that is, to investigate what
has been done until now in a more operational context. This is what will be done in the
first and the second contribution of this thesis. In particular, we will emphasize the fact
that, up to now, the game is totally unfair for the steganographier, as the steganalyzer
has access to too much information regarding the embedding process. With such an
unrealistic access, he or she will be able to set up its artificial intelligence too, in order to
achieve an acceptable classification between natural and steganographied content. After
having raised such an issue, for the sake of completeness and by taking the advantage
from the results to the first and second contribution described hereafter, we will use the
knowledge we acquired to propose a new method of steganography that studies the best
areas in an image by using the second derivative algorithm.
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION
The main contributions of our dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• The first contribution studies the state of the art in the domain of steganalysis sys-
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tems. The performance of steganalyzers has been investigated according to vari-
ous parameters, encompassing the choice of the steganography, its payload, and
the type of images, both during training and testing stages.
• The second contribution deals with understanding and optimizing parameters of
steganalysis. With such learning, we have proposed a kind of universal steganal-
ysis without any knowledge regarding the steganography side. The effects on the
classification score of a modification of either parameters or methods between the
learning and testing stages have been further evaluated.
• In most existing state of the art approaches, the embedded distortion function is
based on image features preservation. Smooth regions or clean edges define im-
age core. Even a small modification in these areas largely modifies image features
and is thus easily detectable. These regions are characterized by disturbed level
curves. We have presented a new distortion function for steganography that is
based on second order derivatives, which are mathematical tools that usually eval-
uate level curves. This is the main part of the third contribution.
4. DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 presents a scientific background of the
state of the art in both steganography and steganalysis fields of research, and the related
literature with their schemes. In Chapter 2, steganalysis methods are evaluated according
to parameters like payloads, features extraction, and the group of image used during both
training and testing stages. In the second contribution, in Chapter 3, the operational
context of steganalysis is regarded, according to various steganography methods. The
third contribution, in Chapter 4, proposed a method of steganography that depends on
the second derivative of the images. Finally, a conclusion and future works are presented
in Chapter 5.
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1SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
1.1/ INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the art of creating invisible communication to provide a secret chan-
nel to exchange hidden information. Various steganography methods have recently been
proposed focusing on digital media. However, these methods still face many problems
related to payloads and classes of applied images. The increasing use of steganography
is a result of Internet development leading to the transmission of numerous information
using many types of social media like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc. The transforma-
tion of the information on the world wide web requires efficient and reliable algorithms to
transmit secret information, in any kind of computer files: images, audios, videos...
Images are considered as the most popular cover media to hide information, due to the
existence of many redundant bits in the digital representation of an image. For this rea-
son, using image files to transfer a secret information is the model that comes first in mind.
Steganography techniques must embed the secret information in regions of a given im-
age that do not lead to a big change in the cover. For instance, embedding in smooth
areas causes a large modification in image features and, thus, it is easily detectable.
Conversely, concealing a hidden information in noisy areas like edges should be hard to
detect, since they make little changes in the image features.
Indeed, hiding information within a given image alter some of its characteristics, and such
an alteration may reveal the existence of a secret message. The main issue for a specific
steganalysis approach is to detect the presence of a secret information, knowing that this
information was hidden by a specific steganography algorithm. The success of a specific
steganalysis method is fully dependent on the available information about the steganog-
raphy algorithm that is used for concealing secret information into the image, while the
blind steganalysis system does not depend on the knowledge about the steganography
schemes applied to the image.
This chapter, which provides the scientific background of our thesis, explores image pro-
cessing and description in Section 1.2. The presentation of steganography techniques is
provided in Section 1.3, while Section 1.4 describes the steganalysis schemes. Finally,
the related work is explained in Section 1.5.
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1.2/ IMAGE PROCESSING AND DESCRIPTION
Visual information is the significant type of data perceived and recognized by the human
brain. Digital images are the most prevalent and convenient way for transferring such
kind of information. The visual information is then processed, manipulated, and inter-
preted by using the methods of digital image processing [6]. This processing plays an
important role in many fields of research, as there is an increasing demand of image pro-
cessing methods in various application areas like multimedia, security data, biomedical,
astronomy, and so on. Most of the time, this processing consists of extracting various
information from the considered digital images [95]. Indeed, the latter is a collection of
a finite number of components, each one having a specific position and value. These
components are referred as picture elements (pixels). Their values represent either the
brightness or the color in the image. The type of operations applied during digital process-
ing depends on what is finally expected. The latter encompass convolution, correlation,
statistical operation, etc. [34, 77].
1.2.1/ IMAGE PREPROCESSING
Digital image processing manipulates the digital image in order to enhance it or to extract
some information from it. Image processing often deals with digital images, but may
concern analog images [61]. In general, it includes three main steps, listed bellow.
• Image acquisition: digital images are created by sensors inside different kind of
light-sensitive cameras. The produced image depends on the type of sensors. In
general, the pixel values depend on light intensity in one or several spectral bands.
It can depend also on various physical measures, such as depth, absorption or
reflectance [104].
• Image preprocessing: operations that are applied on raw images produced by the
acquisition steps. They operate at low level of abstraction to enhance the visual
quality of the images. The preprocessing operation contains image resampling,
contrast enhancement, noise removal, and data compression [97]. It provides too
methods to extract features and objects from image data. Let us finally notice that
these enhancement techniques on images can lead to information loss if they are
not used correctly.
• Output image: This is the last stage that concretely produces the digital image.
1.2.2/ IMAGE ENHANCEMENT
The goal of image enhancement is, as its name suggests, to improve the image qual-
ity. Image enhancements have been widely used in many fields of image processing,
encompassing the following techniques: smooth edges, sharpening certain features of
interest, making an image lighter or darker, increasing or decreasing the contrast, etc.
Such image enhancements are also achieved by applying many filters in various ways,
the main difficulty in such techniques being to provide an objective criterion to measure
the enhancements [86, 101].
Image enhancement techniques can be split into two categories.
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• Spatial domain methods: the pixel values are directly modified [67].
• Frequency domain methods: the image is first transformed in a frequency do-
main by applying a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), a Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) or a Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) operation. Then, the enhancement
operation is performed on the frequency coefficients. The intensity pixels of the out-
put image are then computed using the invert transformation function applied to the
frequency coefficients [50, 83].
1.2.3/ IMAGE FILTERING
1.2.3.1/ PRESENTATION
Images may have been corrupted during acquisition by intensity variations, contrast mod-
ification, illumination changes that may have occurred during the early stages of the ac-
quisition. Therefore, some values may not reflect what were supposed to be embedded in
pixels. Various other situations lead to the necessity to apply image filtering, for instance
to decrease noise and/or take out important image features [68]. Indeed, noise can be
considered as unwanted information in images, as it creates uncomfortable effects as
artifacts, erroneous edges, invisible lines, blurred objects, and corners. There are many
types of noise, which are listed hereafter:
• Gaussian (or electronic) noise: a noise whose probability density function is as
follows,
G(y) =
1
σ
√
2π
e
− (y−µ)
2
2σ2 (1.1)
where µ is the mean value and σ the standard deviation of the noise. The origin
of a Gaussian noise in digital images is mainly caused by natural sources such as
poor illumination, high temperature, or thermal vibration [13].
• Salt and pepper noise: in this kind of noise, the probability density function can be
expressed as follows
G(y) =













Pa, for y = a
Pb, for y = b
0 otherwise
where y represents intensity values of pixels in a noisy image, while a and b are
saturated values (if b > a, intensity b will appear as a light dot on the image and a
appears as a dark dot [7]. The salt and pepper noise appears itself as randomly
putting white and black pixels in the image, while the usual value for pepper noise a
is 0, and for salt noise b, it is 255 [33].
• Speckle noise: this is a multiplicative noise. It reduces the visual evaluation in
ultrasound imaging. Speckle noise can be modeled as random value multiply by
the pixel value [103].
These different types of noise have been illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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(a) Image without noise (b) Image with Gaussian noise
(c) Image with salt and pepper noise (d) Image with speckle noise
Fig. 1.1: Types of noise
1.2.3.2/ TYPE OF FILTERS
There are many techniques to reduce noise in grayscale and color images. The choice of
a filter depends on the nature of the task and the type of the data. There are many factors
that have effects on the filter function such as optical artifacts, color accuracy, and noise.
Linear filtering can be used to reduce particular categories of noise that are related to
“grain” noise. Filters that can achieve such aim are, for instance, Gaussian filters or
averaging. In this kind of filtering, the output pixel is a linear combination of the values in
the input neighborhood of the considered pixel [51].
Linear filtering can be performed by using a convolution technique. Convolution is an
operation in which each generated pixel is the total weighted sum of neighboring infor-
mation pixels [90]. This convolution operation is performed at each point in the image,
see Figure 1.2. It can be applied on an image to emphasize some useful information like
edges. Indeed, many operations in digital image processing use such convolution, like
filters for noise reduction.
Non-linear filters have been proposed to avoid the destruction of lines and sharp edges
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in images caused by linear filters. The median filter is a good example of such nonlinear
filter, see, e.g., [100, 87].
Output_Image Kernel Input_Image
Fig. 1.2: Image Convolution
1.2.4/ EDGE DETECTION
Edges in an image are borders or contour at which important changes occur in some
physical side of an image. These aspects can be represented such as a change in
illumination, in color intensity, and so on. It can also be described as unexpected changes
of continuities in an image. These discontinuities are the changes in pixel intensity that
describe boundaries of objects in a given image.
Edge detection is a process which aims at finding the presence of these discontinuities
and their location. General methods of edge detection include convolving the image
with a two dimensions filter, which is structured to be sensible to large gradients in the
image while giving values of zero in a clear area. Edge detection is a key element in
many image processing techniques such as classification, segmentation, recognition, and
object detection [91].
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1.2.5/ EDGE AND SMOOTH AREA
1.2.5.1/ PRESENTATION
Usually, an edge is a boundary between objects and background. Indeed, they represent
the confines for single objects. Therefore, if the edges can be accurately specified, nu-
merous properties like areas, shapes, and perimeters can be computed. The geometry
of detection can be optimized to search for vertical, horizontal, or diagonal edges in an
image. The edges detection task may be a difficult exercise if we take into consideration
the presence of noise and redundant data in an image, where both the noise and edges
have a high frequency for instance [70]. Figure 1.3 represents the edge detection with
Sobel filter.
Fig. 1.3: Result of edge detection with Sobel filter
Many edge detection techniques are available. Each one is designed to be sensitive
to certain types of edge. This detection technique is fundamentally not based on the
pixel values, but is based on the surrounding of each pixel. Edges are described by
two important features, the first one being the magnitude (i.e., where is recognized the
strength of the edge), while the second feature is the direction, which represents the
angle of the edge.
Ideal edges can be classified according to their intensity as follow [89, 85]:
• Step edge: this type of edge occurs when the values suddenly change from one
value on one side to a different value on the opposite side.
• Ramp edge, Roof edge: happens when intensity change happens over a finite
distance (i.e., not immediately).
• Ridge edge: when the intensity in an image changes instantly but then returns to
the initial value in short distance.
Figure 1.4 represents ideal types of edges in an image.
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Step Edge
Roof Edge
Ridge Edge
Ramp Edge
Fig. 1.4: Edge types
1.2.5.2/ TECHNIQUES OF EDGE DETECTION
In general, the following steps are required to detect edges in image processing [88]:
• Denoising: It is used to reduce random variation in images caused by various types
of noise. Most of the filtering techniques lead to lose some fine edges. The filtering
operation can be described as a smoothing filter followed by applying a derivative
operation. The smoothing is often performed by a convolution function [107].
• Enhancement: In edge detection, it is necessary to consider the variation in inten-
sity in the neighborhood pixels. Enhancement techniques confirm where there is an
important change in neighborhood pixels. This is commonly executed by calculating
a gradient magnitude to the image. The enhancement technique in image process-
ing helps to increase the detectability of the image details. The main objective of
image enhancement techniques is to adjust image characteristics to make it more
appropriate for the given task and to improve the clarity of an image for a human
visual system [9].
• Detection: When the image gradients are computed, some of their values are
nonzero, but not all of these points are edges. The method of edge detection should
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be able to determine which value represents an edge point. The edge detection pro-
cesses are a set of mathematical operations to compute high contrast and intensity
differences in a digital image [59].
There are mainly two techniques for edge detection, which are based on the examination
of the local discontinuity at each pixel.
1. First Order Derivative Edge Detection: the edge detector in this technique is
based on measuring the intensity gradient, magnitude and orientation at pixels.
Gradient � F can be computed using the following equation:
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Both magnitude and orientation can be computed with this formula. We are then left
to find maximum and minimum values of this gradient, in order to detect the edges.
Many kernels are proposed to find an edge in an image using this principle, some
of these kernels are covered here [63]:
• Sobel kernel: the Sobel kernel is a discrete differentiation operator. It is used
to compute the gradient of the image intensity function. The Sobel kernel is
convoluted with the image in the horizontal and vertical direction [78]. Fig-
ure 1.5 represents the result of applying the Sobel kernel.
Fig. 1.5: Edges detection thanks to Sobel kernels
• Robert kernel: It computes the 2-D spatial gradient for an image. The Robert
kernel focuses on regions with high spatial gradient which in most cases be-
long to edges. The values of the pixels after applying this kernel represent the
estimated absolute magnitude of the spatial gradient of the input image at this
point. This kernel consists of a pair of 2x2 convolution kernels as shown in
Figure 1.6. One kernel is simply the other rotated by 90 degrees. This filter
is applied to the input image to produce the gradient components. The two
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component of the gradient can be combined together to find the absolute mag-
nitude of the gradient at each point and the orientation of these gradients [12].
The gradient magnitude is given by:
|G| =
�
(Gx)2 + (Gy)2, (1.2)
while an approximate magnitude can be computed as follow:
|G| = |Gx| + |Gy|. (1.3)
+1 0
0 -1
0 +1
-1 0
Fig. 1.6: Robert kernels
• Prewitt kernel: This kernel is based on the principle of central difference.
The image is defined as a signal and the change in signal can be calculated
using differentiation. Therefore all the kernels that are used for edges detection
are known as derivative kernels. The Prewitt kernel detects horizontal and
vertical edges by using a difference between corresponding pixel intensities of
an image. It is similar to the Sobel filter [78].
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-1 0 1
-1 0 1
-1 0 1
-1 -1 -1
0 0 0
1 1 1
Fig. 1.7: Prewitt kernel vertically and horizontally
2. Second Order Derivative Edge Detection: This operator tries to find peaks in
gradient magnitude. Zero crossings of the second derivative are more accurate for
detecting the edges. Indeed, the first derivative operators are sensitive to noise, but
the second derivative operators will be twice more sensitive [1]. Edge position can
be described in the first and the second derivative as follow:
• The edge represents the local maxima or minima in the first derivative.
• It represents the zero-crossing in the second derivative.
Figure 1.8 depicts first and second derivatives of a given signal.
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First derivative Second derivative
Fig. 1.8: First and second edge derivatives to detect edges
Some masks are used following the second derivative methods to detect the edges.
Among them, we can evoke the Laplacian of Gaussian, described hereafter:
• Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG): The Laplacian is a 2-D measure of the second
spatial derivative of an image. It searches for zero crossing rate to detect the
edges in images. The Laplacian highlights regions of the image that have rapid
intensity changes. The image is smoothed with a Gaussian smoothing filter, in
order to reduce its sensitivity to noise, and then the Laplacian filter is applied,
which is given by:
L(X, Y) =
∂2I
∂X2 +
∂2I
∂Y2 , (1.4)
where I(X, Y) is the pixel intensity function.
The kernel process can be represented as the application of a smoothing filter,
followed by a derivative process for countering the sensitivity to noise [66]. This
process reduces the high frequency noise components before a differentiation step.
Figure 1.9 contains three frequently used kernels.
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0 1 0
1 -4 1
0 1 0
-1 2 -1
2 -4 2
-1 2 -1
1 1 1
1 -8 1
1 1 1
Fig. 1.9: Laplacian of Gaussian
1.2.6/ THRESHOLD
All of these detectors use threshold techniques, whose values are determined thanks to
experiments. Such techniques can be considered as a segmentation process, as they
classify pixels depending on whether they belong to edges or not. Edge detection using
threshold is important in many research areas for image processing.
Edge detection may be difficult to achieve in some situations. The success of detectors
depends on factors like the presence of objects with similar intensities, noise and lighting
conditions, and so on. Some of these problems are solved by choosing a good threshold,
but no definitive method has been determined for automatically choosing such relevant
values [108].
1.3/ STEGANOGRAPHY TECHNIQUES
1.3.1/ GENERAL PRESENTATION
Internet technologies have recently become one of the main way for communication and
information sharing, and so information and data security has become a major concern.
Various measures can be applied to guarantee data and information security during their
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transmission through the Internet, most of them are based on steganography and cryp-
tography [15, 48].
Steganography encompasses all the methods allowing to conceal information in digital
media, with traces of embedding operations as minimal as possible. It is very important
during steganographic exchanges that nobody except the sender and the receiver knows
that a hidden message exists. The general objective of a steganography systems is thus
to not attract unwanted attention. A well known example illustrating that fact is the so-
called Prisoners Problem. Alice and Bob are in prison, locked up in separate rooms far
away from each other. They want to exchange an escape plan through messages [62]
(see Figure 1.10: Alice and Bob represent the prisoners and Wendy is the warden).
Alice Bob
Wendy
Fig. 1.10: The prisoners problem
Figure 1.11 shows the base diagram for digital steganography technique. It represents
two parties, i.e., sender and receiver. They are the two sides of the system, who commu-
nicate over a public channel.
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Receiver
Fig. 1.11: Steganography system
The sender applies an embedding function: Emb : C × M → S .
In this equation, C represents the set of cover images as inputs and M refers to the set
of secret messages that will be embedded in the cover objects. The stego object S is
transferred to the receiver who extracts the secret message M from the stego object S .
The general steganography system can be classified into the following categories [35]:
• Pure steganography: is a steganography technique that does not need to modify
the secret messages before sending it. For that, no information is required to begin
the communication process. The embedding formulation can be written as a map-
ping:
Emb: C × M → S
where C is the set of possible covers and M the set of possible messages. The
extraction process can be described as:
Ext: S → M
extracting the secret message M from the stego image S .
• Secret key Steganography: is a steganography technique in which a key is used
to embed the secret message in a cover object. This cover was chosen by the
sender. When the receiver knows the secret key, he can obtain the evidence of
the embedding message [16]. Figure 1.12 represents a secret steganography
system. The embedding function that explains the secret key steganography can
be expressed as follow:
Emb: C × M × K → S
The sender embeds a message M in an image in the set C by using the set of key
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K. The secret message can be extracted from the stego image when the receiver
knows the secret key. The extracting process is expressed as follow:
Ext: S × K → M
Fig. 1.12: Secret steganography
1.3.2/ DIFFERENT TYPES OF STEGANOGRAPHY
All digital file formats can be used as a carrier in steganography methods, but digital
formats with high redundancy are more convenient to this science domain. Indeed, re-
dundant bits may be easily modified without attracting attention. Figure 1.13 represents
general types of steganography, which are described bellow:
• Text steganography: Text steganography is achieved by changing either the for-
mat of the text or the characters sequence. These two modifications are used for
embedding, leading to a cover object that contains the secret message [2]. Various
ways have been proposed to embed such information in messages, like using word
synonyms, omitting commas, or playing with spelling errors. Most of them degrade
the text quality [11, 22]. This is why that this kind of steganography is not really
used, which can be explained by the low presence of redundant information in text
documents (when compared with images and audio files).
• Image steganography: It is considered as the most important steganography
method nowadays. The secret messages can be embedded in images without in-
ducing a big modification in the cover object [8, 45]. To do so, it is important to hide
the message in noisy areas, to keep visible properties of the image. For instance,
areas that contain many color variations and texture are more suitable to hide secret
messages [64, 21, 11].
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Fig. 1.13: Type of steganography
• Video/Audio steganography: steganography algorithm in video domains focuses
on repeated frames, in which it is possible to conceal secret messages [32].
1.3.3/ PERFORMANCE OF A STEGANOGRAPHIC SCHEME
As any steganography system embeds a secret message in a cover object, its perfor-
mance can be evaluated by the following criteria [8]:
• Steganography capacity: which represents the maximum length of the secret
message that can be hidden in the cover object. The capacity depends on the
embedding function and on the cover object properties [60].
• Steganography security: The objective of steganography is to merely embed a
secret message in the cover media. The security of steganography is achieved by
the difficulty to detect a secret message, which can be compared with the difficulty
to read a message content in cryptography systems [36].
1.3.4/ STEGANOGRAPHY APPLICATIONS
Steganography techniques have many applications, like copyright protection, identity
cards in bank systems (where individual data are concealed in their photos), TV broad-
casting, medical imaging systems, etc. Such methods can be used in secure military
communications too, to transfer any sensitive information by using innocent like cover
images or videos. Other applications in the information security field can be found, for
instance, in [47].
1.3.5/ IMAGES STEGANOGRAPHY
Today, most of the steganography systems use images to conceal secret messages, tak-
ing advantage from the limited human visual perception. Furthermore, noise in images
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gives space to embed secret data. There are many ways for achieving such information
hiding inside images, such as steganography by cover selection, where sender and re-
ceiver exchange secret messages thanks to image contents (for example, the presence
of arms in the image can indicate that there will be an attack). But, in this situation, it is
hard to define a proper theoretical framework for evaluating the security of the method.
This is why steganography by cover modification has been more studied in recent years,
as it allows security evaluation in practice. The number of messages that can be trans-
mitted between the sender and the receiver depends on both the properties of the cover
and the steganography algorithm. For instance, in JPEG images, the sender can conceal
one bit per non-zero DCT coefficient [92, 3], while in raw images, it can embed one bit
per pixel if we consider LSB steganography (see bellow).
The cover modification based steganography techniques are classified into:
1. Substitution techniques: the substitution methods embed the secret message by
replacing not important parts of the cover object with secret information. The secret
message can be extracted by the receiver if he know the exact position where the
hidden information has been embedded [4]. There are several approaches in this
technique:
• Least Significant Bit (LSB) technique: in this method, the sender chooses
the least significant bit of some or all of the bytes of a cover image object to
conceal the secret message, see Figure 1.14. The least significant bits are
used to rebuild the secret information. This method, which embeds the secret
message with little impacts to the cover, is characterized by its simplicity, but it
is not secure [20, 72].
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Secret messageCover image
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1
Stego image
Fig. 1.14: LSB steganography
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• Pseudorandom Permutation technique: instead of focusing on LSBs, we
can use a pseudorandom number generator that randomly selects pixels and
bits inside them, that will receive the secret information [84], as depicted in
Figure 1.15. Bits of the secret message will then be distributed randomly over
the whole cover object [42]. To recover the hidden message at the receiver
side, the same generator is seeded with the same initial value, and thus the
same random locations are indicated by the generator, allowing a message
reconstruction.
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Secret message
Cover image
1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1
Stego image
Fig. 1.15: Pseudorandom steganography
2. Distortion technique: today, the most popular steganography approaches em-
bed a secret message according to the minimization of a distortion function. The
design of this distortion function that indicates where to embed the secret mes-
sage (locations that minimize distortion effects) is the main task of a steganogra-
phy designer. The sender can produce the stego object by applying the sequence
of changes in the cover object. The impact of the embedding process in images
depends on the efficiency of the distortion function [96, 99]. This gives rise to per-
fectly secure steganography, which embeds a secret message while introducing the
smallest possible distortion effects on the cover. Nowadays, most steganography
algorithms [41, 39] depend on this principle for providing methods that can face
steganalysis.
3. Transform domain technique: in these techniques, we manipulate frequency co-
efficients of the image rather than its pixels. The main principle is to compute a 2-D
discrete unitary transform of the image, for instance using the discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT), to manipulate the image in the transform domain, and then to perform
the inverse transform. It is indeed possible to embed the secret message in various
frequency bands of the cover image. Note that the frequency domain steganog-
raphy is slower and more complicated than the simpler substitution technique in
spatial domain [49].
The most frequent applications of such a transform domain technique are either in
DCT domain, or in DWT one. Let us detail them:
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• JPEG transformation: JPEG format is used in image processing to reduce
the size of the image file. Firstly, in color images, the RGB format is converted
into a YUV representation, the Y component representing brightness while the
U and V components act for color or chrominance. Then, the image is divided
into blocks of 8 × 8 pixels, and these blocks are converted into discrete cosine
transform 64-DCT coefficients. After that, the quantization step is computed.
The encoding of coefficients is applied by using Huffman codes to reduce the
size of the image file. In this context, a steganography system that uses the
JPEG image format to conceal the secret message in the non-zero coefficients
of discrete cosine transform is possible [73, 46, 71].
• Wavelet transformation: wavelets transform (WT) converts too the signal
from the spatial domain to the frequency domain. It is a mathematical function
that separates data into frequency components, which makes them suitable for
image compression. The wavelet transform divides the image to the high fre-
quency and the low frequency information, where the high frequency contains
information about the edge elements and the low frequency is divided again
into high and low frequency components [81, 93, 82]. Figure 1.16 represents
an illustration of wavelet decomposition. As in the DCT case, we can embed
the secrecy in the frequency coefficients.
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Fig. 1.16: Wavelet decomposition
• Statistical technique: It tries to modify some statistical properties of the cover
image and to preserve them in the embedding process. A cover object is
partitioned into disjoint blocks, each one containing modified bits. Each part
finally corresponds to a single bit of the secret message [80, 94, 44].
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1.4/ STEGANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
The counterpart of steganography is steganalysis, which is the other important field in
information hiding domain. Steganalysis is the technology of detecting the presence of a
secret information in a cover object. Steganalysis has recently received a lot of attention,
as a countermeasure to the development of the steganography field. The art of ste-
ganalysis consists in magnifying the statistics or features that are sensitive to embedding
operations.
The steganalyser is represented by the warden (Wendy) in Figure 1.10. His degree of
knowledge varies according to the scenario. A popular one is when the warden does
not have any information: neither about the cover object nor the steganography algorithm
and the secret message. This difficult task requires analyzing all images going through
the channel, to detect the presence of hidden messages. In this scenario, the warden
needs steganalysis algorithms able to detect a wide range of steganography schemes.
In another scenario, the warden has some information about secret messages or about
the steganography algorithm. This information increases the rate of success for the war-
den [17, 14].
The warden has a stego detector as follows: F : C → {0, 1}. The response of the warden
is binary, where the answer is 0 for natural contents and 1 for stego ones. The detector
can make two kind of errors. The false alarm (false positive) occurs when the warden
decides that a hidden message is present, but in fact there is no hidden message. The
second type of error is called missed detection (false negative), which occurs when the
warden decides that a hidden message is absent while indeed it exists.
In a security point of view regarding the steganalysis system, there are three broad types
of wardens, which can be described as follows [52]:
• Passive warden: it does not interfere with the content on the transmission channel.
The steganalysis system goal in this case is to detect the mere presence of the
secret communication between Alice and Bob in Fig. 1.10. The warden in this
situation does not have the ability to destroy or modify the secret message that is
detected by the steganalysis algorithm.
• Active warden: the objective of the active warden is to detect and slightly modify
the communicated objects and then send virtually any content to the receiver side.
Compression is an example of digital image modification that can be applied by an
active warden.
• Malicious warden: the warden in this situation has the information about the key.
The secret message can be modified in order to impersonate the sender and trick
the receiver.
Under the Kerckhoffs’s principle, the warden knows all details such as steganography
algorithms, the probability distribution on cover objects, and other information about the
transmission channel between the sender and the receiver – except the stego key. Note
that this scenario rarely happens in reality [52].
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1.4.1/ CLASSIFICATION OF IMAGE STEGANALYSIS
The main goal of the steganalysis system is to detect the presence of a secret message
in cover image. In general the steganalysis system can be divided into two parts as
follow [10]:
1. Specific or targeted Steganalysis: these types of steganalysis systems fully de-
pend on steganography algorithms that are being used to embed secret messages
in cover images. They are sometimes also limited on the image format. These sys-
tems have high success rate but they are inflexible for working on other embedding
algorithms. Bellow are listed some types of specific steganalysis approaches.
• OutGuess attack [26],
• MB1 attack [43],
• LSB Matching Steganography attack [106],
• YASS attack [58].
2. Generic, Universal, or Blind Steganalysis: the universal steganalysis systems
are independent on the steganography algorithms. Generally, the universal ste-
ganalysis is preferred than the specific one. The embedding process for image
leaves statistical artifacts on the image. These statistical artifacts are used to dis-
tinguish between natural and stego images. Among analysis that are used, we can
evoke the following ones:
• binary similarity [5],
• wavelet based analysis [109],
• feature based analysis [24].
1.4.2/ METHODS OF STEGANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
In most steganography techniques, a secret message was concealed either in a sequen-
tial manner or in a random one over the cover image. To discover the presence of a
secret message, many techniques are used by the steganalysis algorithms. This pro-
cess may be visually performed or by analyzing the structure of the image. The detection
techniques can be described as follow [69]:
1. Visual steganalysis: visual inspection can detect the suspicious artifacts if these
artifacts occur in connected areas of uniform color of the image, or if they occur
in area of the image with values either 0 or 255. It is difficult to detect the pres-
ence of the hidden information in noisy images or textured ones. In this technique,
the human eye represents the model of classification. The detection is applicable
to palette image for LSB embedding, as reported for instance by Pfitzmann and
Westfeld [105].
2. Statistical steganalysis: the statistical steganalysis performs the task of detection
through some simplified model of the cover image, obtained by representing the
cover image by a set of numerical features. There are many techniques that are
used to detect the presence of a secret message by using a statistical approaches.
Among them, we can report:
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• Chi-square Analysis: Westfeld and Pfitzmann have proposed [105] a model
of statistical analysis. They noticed the changes of the histogram of the color
frequencies when embedding a secret message in a cover object. In this case,
the embedding process changes the least significant bits of the colors in an
image. The statistical steganalysis is more accurate and successful than the
visual steganalysis, because it is able to discover small changes in a cover
image.
3. Structural steganalysis: structural attacks are designed to take benefit from the
properties of the used steganography algorithm. Each steganography algorithm
leaves characteristics structure in a cover image when embedding the hidden infor-
mation. The structure steganalysis may detect the presence of secret message by
examining the changes in the characteristic of the structure. RS analysis, described
below, is an example of structural attacks.
• RS steganalysis: this is steganalysis system designed to detect LSB em-
bedding schemes in color and grayscale images. To analyze an image, the
approach specifies groups of pixels depending on some properties. Then it
computes the relative frequencies of these groups for the given image to pre-
dict the embedding levels [25].
1.5/ RELATED WORK
1.5.1/ FEATURES
Feature extraction techniques are useful in classifying the images into cover and stego
contents in steganalysis fields. The embedding of secret messages in cover images can
be considered as noise addition, due to the alterations made to the images during em-
bedding. In order to detect such noise, features extraction is a crucial step for many
steganalysis techniques, assuming that a non natural alteration of an original image can
be signaled by significant changes in these features. Obviously, the steganalysis perfor-
mance is highly dependent on the definition of such image features.
Both of targeted and universal steganalysis systems use features to detect hidden infor-
mation in images. The effect of the embedding process in an image can be considered
as adding noise of specific properties. This is why many features are proposed to be
sensitive to adding noise and not sensitive to the image content. Then, after selecting the
features set, the warden can construct the steganalysis system, mainly by using super-
vised classification.
At the beginning, features used for detection in a spatial domain steganography were dif-
ferent from features used in JPEG domain steganography. After that, spatial domain and
JPEG domain features have merged. For instance, Subtractive Pixel Adjacency Model
(SPAM) technique [74] is a method for detection of steganography scheme that embeds
a secret message in a spatial domain. The SPAM features are computed in different direc-
tions, where the difference between pixels and transition probabilities are computed along
same eight directions. These features focus on detection of LSB matching steganogra-
phy. The SRMQ1 rich model [27], for its part, presented a general strategy for constructing
steganography detectors for images. The idea starts with combining a rich model of the
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noise component as a union of different submodel,s that is composed of joint distributions
of neighboring samples using linear and non-linear high-pass filters.
SRM method, proposed in [27], is an extended version of SRMQ1 features that increases
feature diversity to detect the stego image. In JPEG domain, CC-PEV in [53, 76] presents
features extracted directly from the DCT domain. It contains the DCT features that are
extracted from the inter blocks dependencies among DCT coefficients, and the Markov
features that are extracted from intra-block dependencies. They apply calibration to the
extracted features to reduce their dimension. The JPEG domain rich model (JRM) fea-
ture [52, 28], for its part, consists of many diverse submodels taking from intra-block and
inter-block among DCT coefficients. The CC-JRM in [52] is a cartesian calibration of the
JRM features, which performs well for features directly extracted from the DCT domain.
In [37], the DCTR features are computed from noise residuals obtained using the DCT co-
efficients. It has a lower computational complexity when compared with the other feature
extractions methods. The JSRM features are merged between spatial domain SRMQ1
and JRM [52].
1.5.2/ STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM
Recently, numerous algorithms have been developed in the field of images steganogra-
phy. Some of these schemes work in the spatial domain, where they embed a secret
message directly in image pixels. The other schemes transfer images in another do-
main, and then they use these coefficients to conceal the information. In what follows, we
provide some explanations regarding these algorithms.
1. Spatial domain: steganography algorithms are based here on modifying the least
significant bits of image. This principle depends on the fact that the least significant
bits in an image could be considered from random noise, and to modify them when
embed a secret message would have little effect on the image. Some steganog-
raphy algorithms choose the LSB of pixels in a random manner, other techniques
modify them in certain areas of the image, like texture region in an image. Bellow,
some of the works are proposed in this domain.
• Edge-Adaptive (EA): this technique is proposed by Weiqi et al. in [65]. This
algorithm modifies the pixel pairs that have a big difference in absolute value,
for example the pixel in the region around edges in an image. They try to
embed a secret message in sharper edge areas and leave the smooth areas
unchanged.
• Wavelet Obtained Weights (WOW): in [41] Holub and Jessica Fridrich have
proposed the distortion function to compute the cost of each pixel. This algo-
rithm forces the embedding change to texture regions and leave the smooth
regions. This steganography is more resistant to the steganalysis with rich
model. The embedding algorithm uses syndrome trellis codes (STCs) to mini-
mize the distortion for a given payload.
• S-UNIWARD: this embedding process, proposed in [39], is similar to WOW
algorithm. This technique uses the UNIWARD distortion function to embed a
secret message in spatial domain. The pixel costs are computed from three
directions depending on the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal wavelet coeffi-
cients.
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• STABYLO: in [18], Couchot et al. embed a secret message based on a Canny
edge detection filter. This algorithm is lighter than HUGO, WOW, and UNI-
WARD schemes.
• MULTIVARIATE GAUSSIAN MODEL (MVG): in this method, the cover im-
age is modeled as a sequence of independent distributed quantized Gaus-
sians. The embedding process probabilities are derived to minimize the total
Kullback-Leibler (KL) signal divergence when concealing the secret message
using least-significant bit [31].
2. Transform domain: In transform steganography technique, the cover image is
transformed to the required domain. Secret message bits are then embedded in
the coefficients of the transformed cover image.
• Jsteg: the secret message is embedded in DCT coefficient after dividing the
image into blocks then apply the DCT to each block [102].
• F5: this steganography algorithm [98] embeds a secret message in the
nonzero AC DCT coefficient. It can be considered as the first method that
uses the principle of the matrix encoding. The latter is used to improve the
embedding efficiency.
• nsF5: Fridrich et al. in [29] have detailed an improvement of F5. This scheme
removes the shrinkage that occurs due to the embedding in AC DCT coeffi-
cient, where a coefficient becomes zero after the embedding process. Shrink-
age decreases the embedding efficiency.
• OutGuess: In [79], authors try to preserve the statistical properties of a cover
image to prevent statistical detection. This algorithm embeds a secret informa-
tion in the DCT coefficients.
• J-UNIWARD: Holub et al., in [39], use the UNIWARD to embed a secret infor-
mation in arbitrary domain. The distortion function is computed in a directional
filter bank decomposition as a sum of relative changes between the cover and
stego image applied in a wavelet domain. This steganography algorithm forces
the embedding process to the regions that are difficult to model, in many di-
rections such as noisy area and avoid the smooth areas in a cover object.
1.5.3/ STEGANALYSIS RESULT
The detector takes a learning based strategy that includes a training stage and a testing
one. The extracted features are used both in training and testing stage. The trained
classifier is extracted from the training stage. There are many classifiers in the field of
artificial intelligence such as support vector machine (SVM), neural network (NN), Fisher
linear discriminant (FLD), etc. Figure 1.17 explains the steganalysis classifier.
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Fig. 1.17: Steganalysis classifier
To measure the performance of the steganalysis system, the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) approach is used. This evaluation process depends on the number of false
alarm and missed detection. Steganalysis algorithms having their ROC curves close to
the diagonal are not accurate. Conversely, a steganalysis technique s.t. the ROC curve
has a big area under the curve (AUC) is accurate. Figure 1.18 illustrates two types of
ROC curves.
Ensemble classifier [55] with Rich model [28] is used to detect steganography method
that embeds a secret message in a spatial domain. Some schemes are detected by the
following combination: Highly Undetectable steGO HUGO [23], where the detection rate
of 10,000 images from BOSS base with payload 0.1 and 0.4 is 0.13 and 0.37 respec-
tively. In this technique, the co-occurrence matrices size are increased exponentially with
respect to the neighborhood length. This problem was solved by enlarging neighboring
residual sizes and project them into random directions instead of extracting co-occurrence
matrices [38]. This reduces the detection error rate for the payload 0.1 and 0.4 to 0.12
and 0.36 to the HUGO steganography method. The same experiment with the same
set of the image was applied to WOW [41], S-UNIWARD [40] steganography methods.
The error detection of the WOW method of payload 0.1 and 0.4 is 0.18 and 0.39 and for
the S-UNIWARD scheme the error detection is 0.18 and 0.40 [38]. Denemark et al [19]
have been obtained more accurate results, where they modified the calculus of the co-
occurrence matrix by memorizing the maximum of the neighboring change probabilities
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(a) Strong accurate detector (b) Weak accurate detector
Fig. 1.18: Types of ROC curve
instead of their mean. According to this modification, the error detection was reduced to
0.19 and 0.37 for payload 0.1 and 0.4 to the S-UNIWARD, while for the WOW method the
error detection is 0.15 and 0.30.
1.6/ CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented an overview of how to use images as covers in which to
hide secret messages. Steganography techniques can use images in spatial domain by
directly embedding the information in the image pixels. Similarly, they can insert informa-
tion in a transformed frequency view of the image. Steganography schemes that work
in spatial and frequency domains have been described. Additionally, steganalysis tech-
niques that are used to detect secret messages in images have been explained. The
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) has finally been presented, as a method that is
useful for evaluating steganography algorithms.
II
CONTRIBUTIONS
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2PERFORMANCE STUDY OF
STEGANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
2.1/ INTRODUCTION
The presence of many methods of steganography led to study the effect of some of these
methods on well-known steganalysis systems. The steganalysis system was examined
according to changing some factor such as the payloads, the type of steganography
schemes, and the set of images that are used in training and testing stage in the ste-
ganalysis operations. The reason to be of this work is to consider the evaluation process
that is used to compare information hiding techniques. To do so, we will first determine the
challenge corresponding to this evaluation process consisting mainly of 1) the rules of the
game between the steganographier and the steganalyser, 2) the fairness in these rules,
and 3) the data, in form of knowledge, shared by each player. This challenge will also
be reasonably associated with some forensics situations. In addition, we will investigate
more realistic challenges, not yet considered in the literature, to evaluate the behavior
of up-to-date steganalysers in an operational context that corresponds more reasonably
to real case attacks. In our evaluations, we aim at bridging the gap between laboratory
approaches and real operational situations.
The performance of some state-of-the-art steganalysers is investigated according to var-
ious parameters, encompassing the choice of the steganographier, its payload, and the
type of images both during training and testing stage. All these parameters are changed
to determine their effects on steganalysis performance. Experiments are performed using
large sets of grayscale JPEG images of different types. The results indicate that modify-
ing parameters that are usually considered in the literature, and which are very specific,
dramatically decreases steganalysis performances. This chapter is organized as follows.
Section 2.2 describes all the experiments and explains the criteria used to evaluate the
Ensemble Classifier steganalyser tool, including payloads and steganography methods.
The evaluation results are described in Section 2.3. This work has been published in
IEEE Applied Research in Computer Science and Engineering (ICAR), 2015.
2.2/ EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The performance of the Ensemble Classifier steganalyser has first been evaluated for its
dependence on the image databases used in our training/testing stages. The databases
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used in these experiments are presented in Section 2.2.1.
2.2.1/ IMAGE DATABASES
It is reasonable to wonder whether the sensitivity of the Ensemble Classifier depends
on the image databases used either during training or testing stage. The motivation
behind this questioning is that, unlike the secret message recipient, the adversary1 has
not necessarily access to the same set of images used to train the Ensemble Classifier
during the challenge. In some of our experiments we will investigate the image database
sensitivity of the steganalysers results. We have used three coherent sets of images,
downloaded from three different websites, as described in Table 2.1. We note that each
image has been converted to a 512 × 512 grayscale JPEG.
Table 2.1: Sets of images used during experiments.
Category Boss images Art images
Plant and landscape
Number of images
7518 8745 10788
Origin Boss WGA
Various websites
2.2.2/ WORKING PROCEDURE
Steganography system detectors consist of two basic parts: an image modeling and a
machine learning stage. The machine learning tool is trained using a set of features
extracted from cover and stego images. The Ensemble Classifier classifies thereafter
these feature vectors derived from both cover and stego images. In these experiments,
we provided to the Ensemble Classifier two feature sets, namely CC-PEV and CC-JRM.
Both nsF5 and J-UNIWARD have been considered to embed secret messages in the
experiments described thereafter.
All the experiments are used to investigate the performance of the Ensemble Classifier
against changes in various parameters like payload, steganography methods, and so on.
In the following experiments, the secret message is embedded in cover images using
steganographic methods to obtain stego images. Features are then extracted from both
cover and stego images. These features are finally used by the steganalysis system to
determine whether a secret message exists in the image.
1a person or a process with intentions of compromising the secret message
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2.3/ RESULTS EVALUATION
The behavior of the Ensemble Classifier regarding payload modifications is evaluated
in the next section. The impact of changing the steganography method is evaluated
in Section 2.3.2. Finally, the effect of modifying the images during training and testing
stages is investigated in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1/ DETECTION EVOLUTION WHEN MODIFYING PAYLOADS WITH NSF5
Steganalysers are usually evaluated in the literature using a steganographier chosen by
the evaluator. This latter is usually set at a payload of 0.2, which means that 1 bit of
secret message is inserted to each 5 pixels of the host image. Here, we evaluate the
performance of the state-of-the-art steganalysers using payloads that range from 0.004
to 0.2. In fact, we consider that a too large payload size is 1) not realistic, 2) totally unfair
for the steganographier, and 3) can be too much lenient for the steganalyser side.
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Fig. 2.1: ROC curves on different payloads.
In this run of tests, 27,051 JPEG images of various types have been considered as cover
images, and the nsF5 steganography method has been used to embed a random secret
message into the host content. Four different lengths of messages have been considered
according to the payloads 0.004, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 which are respectively 1049, 13107,
26214 and 52429 bits. The smallest length corresponds to the length of tweet messages,
which in practice can be enough to send useful information secretly.
The set of images in our experiments have then been randomly separated into two equal
subsets; one has been used for training the Ensemble Classifier while the other has
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been provided to the testing stage. The performance obtained with the aforementioned
payloads are presented in Figure 2.1. As it can be observed, the results of the Ensemble
Classifier set with payloads used in the literature (0.1 and 0.2) are acceptable, while when
the payloads are more realistic (0.05 or 0.004), the performance degradation is obvious.
In other words, this state-of-the-art Ensemble Classifier totally fails in separating natural
and stego contents when considering hidden messages of reasonable lengths like a twitt.
2.3.2/ CLASSIFICATION SENSIBILITY TO THE STEGANOGRAPHY METHOD
A second disputable choice of the literature is to use the same steganographier in the
learning stage of the steganalyser and in its evaluation. This means that the adversary
knows which tool has been used by the steganographier. However in the reality it is rare,
though possible, that the steganalyser has both this knowledge and the access to the
steganographic tool.
The challenge in the literature is then “Knowing that the steganographier has used that
tool, which is publicly available, can you separate original and stego-contents using your
set of images and a known payload of 0.1”. Again, this game is easy to win, but totally
unfair for the steganographier side. A more realistic challenge should be: “Given this set
of images, can you answer the following questions: (1) Are there some hidden messages
? (2) Can you separate original and stego contents ? (3) Can you provide information on
the steganographic tool ? (4) What about the secret message ?” Indeed, in operational
steganalysis, the tool used by the steganographier is not known by the steganalyser.
Furthermore, a steganographier aware of current information hiding advances will use
neither publicly available tools nor public images, but instead he/she will prefer to design
his/her own method to evaluate on his/her set of images.
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Fig. 2.2: ROC curve when learning has been realized using nsF5 and J-UNIWARD.
The objective of this section is thus to test the Ensemble Classifier versus several
steganography methods. In this experiment, a set of 5,788 “natural” homogeneous im-
ages of size 512 × 512 is used with a payload of 0.1. CC-PEV548 is used to extract 548
features from each image. The steganalyser must classify images that are steganogra-
phied either using nsF5 (first experiment) or J-UNIWARD (second one).
As it can be observed in Figure 2.2, using this payload, the steganalyser is able to ac-
curately identify original from stego contents for images steganographied using nsF5.
However, when the J-UNIWARD is used instead, the steganalyser behavior is similar to
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a random black box, and it totally fails in separating these content. Indeed it is not sur-
prising, as nsF5 operates on DCT coefficients while J-UNIWARD modifies the wavelet
ones.
The JPEG rich model (JRM) CC-JRM [54] feature extraction library is now used in place
of the CC-PEV548 one. CC-JRM extracts 22,510 features from a large number of smaller
submodels of DCT distribution coefficients from both cover and stego images. When the
CC-JRM features are used in the Ensemble Classifier, results are acceptable if nsF5 is
used, see Figure 3.3. But the Ensemble Classifier ability to separate original and stego
contents fails when using J-UNIWARD.
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Fig. 2.3: ROC curve when using different methods of feature extraction CC-PEV, CC-JRM
for nsF5 and J-UNIWARD.
To sum up, in the two scenarios investigated above and with two different features ex-
traction, it is hard for the Ensemble Classifier to distinguish between cover and stego
images, even when all accessible information (images, features and steganographiers) is
assumed to be known during the challenge.
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2.3.3/ MODIFICATION ON TRAINING AND TESTING SETS
In real life, there is no restriction when choosing the groups of images used for embedding
the secret message, and the steganalyser cannot force the steganographier to use a
suitable set of pictures. This is why we now investigate what happens when there is a
change in the groups of images between the training and testing stage. This corresponds
to the situation where the steganalyser has not access to the set of original images used
on the steganographier side, which should be the usual evaluation context: when both
sides share the same set of images, the steganalyser has only to test if the images sent
through the communication channel is in his set of images.
In this last experiment, 27,051 images have been used as covers and the same number
as stego. nsF5 is used as steganography method with a payload of 0.1. The features are
computed from the cover and stego images by using the CC-PEV548 method. However,
in this test, the default strategy for building training and testing set is not used: images
are selected here according to the difference D between the cover images X and its
stego images emb(X,m) on fifty co-occurred features. These features depend on the
neighboring DCT coefficients and they are determined as follows:
D =
�
f∈F
| f (X) − f (emb(X,m))| (2.1)
where F is the set of co-occurrence features.
This value is used to select the images that are more sensitive to the variations in the
value of these specific features. According to this difference, we selected 15,000 images
having a large difference between their cover and stego version, while 4,000 images are
chosen with a small difference. When the Ensemble Classifier is trained with images that
have large differences and tested with the images that have small ones as in Figure 2.4,
we are able to deflate the classification, as illustrated by the evolution of the ROC curve
from Figure 2.2 to Figure 2.4.
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Fig. 2.4: ROC curve according to the type of train and test sets.
2.4/ CONCLUSION
We have initially investigated the ability of the Ensemble Classifier to separate original
from stego contents when using different payloads. We have shown that the classifier
cannot detect the presence of secret messages when the latter have small length such
as a tweet message.
The Ensemble Classifier has been evaluated with several steganographiers. In this ex-
periment we have demonstrated that the steganalysis results can be improved when the
learning set is constructed with a much coarser steganographier (such as nsF5) while
keeping in mind that the objective is to classify images that may be modified with a more
efficient scheme (namely UNIWARD).
We showed that the Ensemble Classifier combined with CC-PEV548 and CC-JRM fails to
distinguish between the cover and stego when the steganographier is based on wavelet
coefficients.
And finally, we have evaluated the Ensemble Classifier in a scenario where the stegano-
graphic scheme is not previously known, leading again to a fail of separation between
original and stego contents.
With the development of numerous steganography methods, it becomes easy to use var-
ious steganographic schemes in training and testing stages, as a means of improving the
detection rate of the message presence in cover object (regardless all the other informa-
tion that are required to detect a message in an image). This is what is investigated in the
next section.

3STEGANALYZER PERFORMANCES IN
OPERATIONAL CONTEXTS
3.1/ INTRODUCTION
Steganalyzers of the literature are usually evaluated as follows. The steganographier
scheme s is firstly chosen, while a large set of images are separated in two sets, half
of each two parts being steganographied using s. Then the first set is used during the
learning stage, while the steganalysis method is evaluated using the second set. Such
an evaluation corresponds to the particular situation where the warden Eve (the stegana-
lyzer) has the knowledge of which steganographier has been used, with which parameters
(embedding payload, etc.) In this work, we will investigate a more realistic scenario where
Eve only knows that images contain secret messages: she does not know which stegano-
graphic algorithm has been used, and the game consists of separating well original from
stego contents. More precisely, in this research work, we show what happens when the
learning stage has been realized with a wrong steganographier, and we ask whether it
is useful to use more than one steganographier during the learning stage to face this
problem. In this chapter, we determine whether it is possible to construct a kind of univer-
sal steganalyzer without any knowledge regarding the steganographier side. The effects
on the classification score of a modification of either parameters or methods between
the learning and testing stages are then evaluated, while the possibility to improve the
separation score by merging many methods during learning stage is deeper investigated.
This chapter is organized as follows, in Section 3.2, we first investigate the effect of a
wrong assumption on the steganographier during the learning stage. In Section 3.3, we
wonder whether it is possible to solve this problem by mixing more than one steganogra-
phier during the learning stage, in order to design a kind of universal detector. Errors on
payload assumption are then discussed in Section 3.4. All these situations are merged
in Section 3.5, leading to what can be expected for operational contexts. This work has
been published in IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and
Multimedia Signal Processing (IIH-MSP).
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3.2/ TRAINING AND TESTING STAGES USE NOT THE SAME
STEGANOGRAPHIER
Let us first measure the effects of modifying the steganographic method between the
training and the testing stage. To investigate this question, 2, 000 original JPEG images
have been used in our experiments. They are taken from the BOSS contest [75], their
size is equal to 512 × 512, and they have been converted to JPEG. For stego images, an
embedding payload of 0.1 is used. The method used for extracting the features from the
images is CC-PEV. The same ensemble classifier has been used both in the training and
in the testing stage, namely the one of [56].
In the first experiment, the ensemble classifier is trained using 50% of the natural images
and 50% of the same images steganographied by nsF5, while it is tested using the same
rate of natural and J-UNIWARD images. Conversely, in the second set of experiments,
J-UNIWARD is used during the training stage and nsF5 during the testing one. Obtained
results are presented in Figure 3.1. It can be seen that the presence of hidden messages
embedded with J-UNIWARD is more or less detected when the steganalyzer has been
trained by using nsF5. Conversely, the detection of nsF5 is impossible when learning
with J-UNIWARD. This asymmetric behavior may be explained by the fact that the use of
nsF5 affects more the general aspect of the embedding image compared to J-UNIWARD.
So, the ensemble classifier can learn more from the former than from the latter, and its
classification is thus more efficient and trustworthy. This result has been obtained again
when considering all other possible combinations, see Table 3.1: the only acceptable
performances are obtained when nsF5 is used during the training stage.
Table 3.1: Errors when choosing the learning steganographier with payload 0.1
Learning stage Testing stage A.U.C. A.T.E
nsF5 J-UNIWARD 0.7290 0.3569
J-UNIWARD nsF5 0.5413 0.4675
nsF5 HUGO 0.7523 0.3345
HUGO nsF5 0.5371 0.4737
J-UNIWARD HUGO 0.5122 0.4912
HUGO J-UNIWARD 0.5077 0.4915
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(a) nsF5 for training, and J-UNIWARD for testing with payload 0.1
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Fig. 3.1: The steganographier used during the training stage is not the good one.
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3.3/ TRYING TO IMPROVE STEGANALYZER SCORE BY MIXING
LEARNING STEGANOGRAPHIERS
In this new scenario, we wonder whether the steganalysis performance can be improved
by using more than one steganographier during the learning stage: if two or three
steganographiers are suspected by Eve, can she use such a suspicion to produce a
more accurate steganalyzer ? Or, to say this differently, is it possible to create a kind of
universal steganalyzer by using a large set of steganographiers during the learning stage
? Results of these experiments are given in Table 3.2 and partially illustrated in receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves of Figure 3.2. In this table, each row corresponds
to an experiment where more than one steganographier has been used during the learn-
ing stage. Each tuple in this table gives the proportion of, respectively, natural images,
HUGO, J-UNIWARD, and nsF5 stego-contents that has been used to constitute the set
of 2,000 images, either during training or during testing stage. A payload of 0.1 has been
used as previously. However, the area under the curve (AUC) obtained here never be-
comes larger than 0.7, while it was the case in Table 3.1, setting at naught the hope to
constitute universal steganalyzer by mixing several tools when training.
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Table 3.2: Study of accuracy by mixing various steganographiers when training. Each
tuple represents the respective percentage of natural images, HUGO, J-UNIWARD, and
nsF5 stego-contents.
Learning stage Testing stage A.U.C A.T.E
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.6899 0.3584
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6097 0.4269
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6133 0.4284
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.6914 0.3518
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.5104 0.4920
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.5208 0.4855
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.5415 0.4692
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6039 0.4306
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6158 0.4149
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 25, 0, 25) 0.5404 0.4718
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 25, 25, 0) 0.6072 0.4303
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 25, 25, 0) 0.6585 0.4199
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6095 0.4311
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6321 0.4155
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(a) In the training stage: 1000 natural images, together with 500 nsF5 and 500 HUGO stego-
contents. In the testing stage: 1000 natural and 1000 JUNIWARD.
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(b) In the training stage: 1500 natural + 1500 JUNIWARD, while in the testing set: 500 natural
and 500 JUNIWARD
Fig. 3.2: Mixing various steganographiers in the learning stage.
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3.4/ UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS REGARDING PAYLOAD
The objective is now to emphasize the possible effects of payload ignorance on stegan-
alyzer performances. Indeed, a large payload of 0.1 is always chosen for evaluating ste-
ganalyzers of the literature. By doing so, steganalyzer designers made strong assump-
tions that make life less complicated, and the game totally unfair in their own advantage.
These two assumptions are that the steganographier will absurdly use a very large pay-
load, and additionally this payload is known by the steganalyzer. Everything happens as
if steganalyzer designers claim to be able to detect if a communication channel possibly
contains stego images, while they finally answer to the challenge: “knowing the set of im-
ages, the presence of hidden information, the steganographier, and the payload, can we
separate with a good accuracy the natural from the stego images.” On our side, we argue
that it is not possible to expect exactly the payload value chosen by the steganographier
in operational contexts.
Fig. 3.3: Differences between host content with nsF5 when payload is respectively equal
to 0.1 or 0.005.
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In this new run of tests, images are steganographied by using respective payloads of
0.005, 0.05, and 0.1 (see Figure 3.3 to understand the effects of such payloads on host
contents). CC-PEV features are used with ensemble classifier in both training and testing
stages. nsF5, J-UNIWARD, and HUGO have been successively tested using the 3 pay-
loads listed above, to illustrate the effects of such an error for both spatial and frequency
embedding. Obtained results are summarized in Table 3.3. As can be seen, the only
situation where the separation is acceptable is the nsF5 one, and when training with a
large payload that helps the ensemble classifier to learn the embedding effects.
Table 3.3: Result of steganalysis when there is a payload error during training
Train Test A.U.C A.T.E
nsF5 0.1 0.05 0.7855 0.2854
0.1 0.005 0.7723 0.3195
0.05 0.1 0.6656 0.3933
0.005 0.1 0.5408 0.4717
J-UNIWARD 0.1 0.05 0.5049 0.4949
0.1 0.005 0.5091 0.4955
0.05 0.1 0.5087 0.4958
0.005 0.1 0.5035 0.4980
HUGO 0.1 0.05 0.5175 0.4898
0.1 0.005 0.5161 0.4885
0.05 0.1 0.5182 0.4867
0.005 0.1 0.5192 0.4853
3.5/ OPERATIONAL CONTEXTS
We now consider the most realistic scenario where the steganalyzer side only knows that
one of the 3 most famous steganographier tools are used. But he is not sure about the
chosen payload. Obtained results when mixing both the steganographier and its payload
between training and testing stages have then been computed, and obtained results are
summarized in Table 3.4.
As can be deduced from this table, the classification is acceptable only when the learning
process has been realized with nsF5 and with a larger payload than the one that has
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been used during the tests. In this situation, it has been possible to separate, with a
medium accuracy, images steganographied by either HUGO or J-UNIWARD. Remark
that obtained results are better than what has been found in Table 3.3.
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Fig. 3.4: Train with nsF5 with a 0.1 payload and test with J-UNIWARD with a 0.005 pay-
load
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Table 3.4: AUC scores in operational contexts
Train Test A.U.C A.T.E
Train: nsF5 0.1 0.05 0.7388 0.3530
Test:J-UNIWARD 0.1 0.005 0.7504 0.3325
0.05 0.1 0.5926 0.4482
0.005 0.1 0.5057 0.4952
Train:nsF5 0.1 0.05 0.7489 0.3320
Test:HUGO 0.1 0.005 0.7554 0.3327
0.05 0.1 0.5791 0.4378
0.005 0.1 0.5041 0.4971
Train:J-UNIWARD 0.1 0.05 0.5140 0.4905
Test:HUGO 0.1 0.005 0.5119 0.4916
0.05 0.1 0.5035 0.4967
0.005 0.1 0.5020 0.4997
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3.6/ CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on experiments in Kerckhoffs’s context: everything about the
used steganographic schemes, except the key, are known by steganalysis systems.
Thanks to a large number of experiments, we indeed have shown that even J-UNIWARD
can be detected when learning with other steganographic tools (namely HUGO and
NSF5). This is observed even if the objective is to analyse a small payload based
steganographic tool. In such a situation, it is sufficient to set a large payload in the
learning step.
After studying the factors that have effects on the steganalysis system in the first contri-
bution, then the steganalysis performance in operational context has been studied in the
second one. It becomes interesting to develop a steganography scheme that embeds a
secret message in cover object, but in noisy areas like texture and edges. This is the
objective of the next chapter.

4A SECOND ORDER DERIVATIVES
BASED APPROACH FOR
STEGANOGRAPHY
4.1/ INTRODUCTION
The steganography tools exploit the presence of edges in the cover image as a chaotic re-
gion to embed the secret messages in cover image object. The edge detection operation
begins with the checking of the discontinuity at each pixel. Gradient, amplitude and ori-
entation are important characteristics of possible edges. Depending on these properties,
the edge detection algorithms have to determine whether a pixel is an edge or not. Most
of edge detection algorithms are based in some way of measuring the intensity gradient at
a point in the image. The gradient image magnitude represents the strength of the edge,
it means the difference amount between pixels. The gradient orientation represents the
direction to the greatest change, which perhaps is the direction across the edge. Edge
detection in an image is traditionally applied by convolving the signal with some type of
filter, generally a filter that approximates a first or second derivative operator.
Steganographic schemes are evaluated according to their ability to face steganalyser
tools. An error is either a false positive decision or a false negative one. The average
error is thus the mean of these two ones. Let us select a security level expressed as a
number in [0, 0.5], when developing a new steganographic scheme, the objective is to find
an approach that maximizes the size of the message that can be embedded in any image
with an average error larger than this security level.
Steganography schemes are designed with the objective of minimizing a defined distor-
tion function. In most existing state of the art approaches, this distortion function is based
on image feature preservation. Since smooth regions or clean edges define image core,
even a small modification in these areas largely modifies image features and is thus eas-
ily detectable. On the contrary, textures, noisy or chaotic regions are so difficult to model
that the features having been modified inside these areas are similar to the initial ones.
These regions are characterized by disturbed level curves. This work presents a new
distortion function for steganography that is based on second order derivatives, which
are mathematical tools that usually evaluate level curves. Two methods are explained to
compute these partial derivatives and have been completely implemented. In each edge
detection techniques there are attempts to detect the most important edges by applying
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threshold techniques. For the first experiment, the second order derivative is chosen as
a method for edge detection to select noisy regions. These chaotic regions are used to
embed a secret message depending on the distortion function. The experiment gave an
idea to use the second derivative as a base for steganography methods. To complete this
work and to achieve the target of the steganography algorithm of the resistance to the
existing steganalysis systems, we focus on selecting some points from chaotic regions to
conceal the secret message. The selection of points depends on the threshold technique.
This work first explains how such first and second order approximations can be computed
on numerical images (Section 4.2). Two proposals to compute second order derivatives
are proposed and proven (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4). An adaptation of an existing
distortion function is studied in Section 4.5. A whole set of experiments is presented
in Section 4.6. The threshold technique is explains in Section 4.7 Concluding remarks
and future work are presented in the last section. Section 4.2 to Section 4.7 have been
published in SECRYPT 2016.
4.2/ DERIVATIVES IN AN IMAGE
This section first recalls links between level curves, gradient, and Hessian matrix (Sec-
tion 4.2.1). It next analyses them using kernels from signal theory
4.2.1/ HESSIAN MATRIX
Let us consider that an image can be seen as a numerical function P that associates a
value P(x, y) to each pixel of coordinates (x, y). The variations of this function in (x0, y0)
can be evaluated thanks to its gradient ∇P, which is the vector whose two components
are the partial derivatives in x and in y of P:
∇P(x0, y0) =
�∂P
∂x (x0, y0),
∂P
∂y (x0, y0)
�
.
In the context of two variables, the gradient vector points to the direction where the func-
tion has the highest increase. Pixels with close values thus follow level curve that is
orthogonal to the one of highest increase.
The variations of the gradient vector are expressed in the Hessian matrix H of second-
order partial derivatives of P.
H =















∂2P
∂x2
∂2P
∂x∂y
∂2P
∂y∂x
∂2P
∂y2















.
In one pixel (x0, y0), the larger the absolute values of this matrix are, the more the gradient
is varying around (x0, y0). We are then left to evaluate such an Hessian matrix.
This task is not as easy as it appears since natural images are not defined with differ-
entiable functions from R2 to R. Following subsections provide various approaches to
compute these Hessian matrices.
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4.2.2/ CLASSICAL GRADIENT IMAGE APPROACHES
In the context of image values, the most used approaches to evaluate gradient vectors
are the well-known “Sobel”, “Prewitt”, “Central Difference”, and “Intermediate Difference”
ones.
Table 4.1: Kernels of usual image gradient operators
Name Sobel Prewitt
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Each of these approaches applies a convolution product ∗ between a kernel K (recalled
in Table 4.1) and a 3 × 3 window of pixel values A. The result A ∗ K is an evaluation of
the horizontal gradient, i.e.,
∂P
∂x expressed as a matrix in R. Let K
. be the result of a π/2
rotation applied on K. The vertical gradient
∂P
∂y is similarly obtained by computing A ∗ K
.,
which is again expressed as a matrix in R.
The two elements of the first line of the Hessian matrix are the result of applying the
horizontal gradient calculus first on ∂P∂x and next on
∂P
∂y . Let us study these Hessian
matrices in the next section.
4.2.3/ HESSIAN MATRICES INDUCED BY GRADIENT IMAGE APPROACHES
First of all, it is well known that
∂2P
∂x∂y is equal to
∂2P
∂y∂x if the approach that computes the
gradient and the one which evaluates the Hessian matrix are the same. For instance, in
the Sobel approach, it is easy to verify that the calculus of
∂2P
∂x∂y and of
∂2P
∂y∂x are both
the result of a convolution product with the Kernel Ks��xy given in Table 4.2. This one
summarizes kernels K��
x2
and K��xy that allow to respectively compute
∂2P
∂x2 and
∂2P
∂x∂y with a
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convolution product for each of the usual image gradient operator. The Sobel kernel Ks��
x2
Table 4.2: Kernels of second order gradient operators
Sobel Prewitt
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allows to detect whether the central pixel belongs to a “vertical” edge, even if this one is
noisy, by considering its vertical neighbours. The introduction of these vertical neighbours
in this kernel is meaningful in the context of finding edges, but not very accurate when the
objective is to precisely find the level curves of the image. Moreover, all the pixels that
are in the second and the fourth column in this kernel are ignored. The Prewitt Kernel
has similar drawbacks in this context.
The Central Difference kernel Kc��
x2
is not influenced by the vertical neighbours of the
central pixel and is thus more accurate here. However, the kernel Kc��xy again looses the
values of the pixels that are vertically and diagonally aligned with the central one.
Finally, the Intermediate Difference kernel Ki��
x2
shifts to the left the value of horizon-
tal variations of
∂P
∂x : the central pixel (0, 0) exactly receives the value
P(0, 2) − P(0, 1)
1
−
P(0, 1) − P(0, 0)
1
, which is an approximation of
∂P
∂x (0, 1) and not of
∂P
∂x (0, 0). Furthermore
the Intermediate Difference kernel Ki��xy only deals with pixels in the upper right corner,
loosing all the other information.
Due to these drawbacks, we are then left to produce another approach to find the level
curves with strong accuracy.
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4.3/ SECOND ORDER KERNELS FOR ACCURATE LEVEL CURVES
This step aims at finding accurate level curve variations in an image. We do not restrict
the kernel to have a fixed size (e.g., 3 × 3 or 5 × 5 as in the aforementioned schemes).
This step is thus defined with kernels of size (2n + 1) × (2n + 1), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, where N
is a parameter of the approach.
The horizontal gradient variations are thus captured thanks to (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) square
kernels
Ky��x2 =

















































0 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . 0
1
2n
0 . . . 0 −
2
2n
0 . . . 0
1
2n
0 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . 0

















































When the convolution product is applied on a (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) window, the result is
1
2
�
P(0, n) − P(0, 0)
n
−
P(0, 0) − P(0,−n)
n
�
, which is indeed the variation between the gradient
around the central pixel. This proves that this calculus is a correct approximation of
∂2P
∂x2 .
When n is 1, this kernel is a centered version of the horizontal Intermediate Difference
kernel Ki��
x2
modulo a multiplication by 1/2. When n is 2, this kernel is equal to Kc��
x2
.
The vertical gradient variations are again obtained by applying a π/2 rotation to each
horizontal kernel Ky��
x2
.
The diagonal gradient variations are obtained thanks to the (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) square
kernels Ky��xy defined by
Ky��xy =
1
4
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.
When n is 1, Ky��xy is equal to the kernel Kc
��
xy, and the average vertical variations of the
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horizontal variations are
1
4
[((P(0, 1) − P(0, 0)) − (P(1, 1) − P(1, 0)))+
((P(−1, 1) − P(−1, 0)) − (P(0, 1) − P(0, 0)))+
((P(0, 0) − P(0,−1)) − (P(1, 0) − P(1,−1)))+
((P(−1, 0) − P(−1,−1)) − (P(0, 0) − P(0,−1)))]
=
1
4
[P(1,−1) − P(1, 1) − P(−1,−1) + P(−1, 1)] .
which is Ky��xy.
Let us now consider any number n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N. Let us first investigate the vertical variations
related to the horizontal vector �P0,0P0,1 (respectively �P0,−1P0,0) of length 1 that starts from
(resp. that points to) (0, 0). Like in the case n = 1, there are 2 new vectors of length 1,
namely �Pn,0Pn,1 and �P−n,0P−n,1 (resp. �Pn,−1Pn,0, and �P−n,−1P−n,0), that are vertically aligned
with �P0,0P0,1 (resp. with �P0,−1P0,0).
The vertical variation is now equal to n. Following the case where n is 1 to compute the
average variation, the coefficients of the first and last line around the central vertical line
are thus from left to right:
1
4n
,
−1
4n
,
−1
4n
, and
1
4n
.
Cases are similar with vectors �P0,0P0,1, . . . �P0,0P0,n which respectively lead to coefficients
−
1
4 × 2n
, . . . , −
1
4 × n.n
(the proof is omitted). Finally, let us consider the vector �P0,0P0,1
and its vertical variations when δy is n − 1. As in the case where n = 1, we thus obtain
the coefficients 1
4 × (n − 1)n
and −
1
4 × (n − 1)n
(resp. −
1
4 × (n − 1)n
and
1
4 × (n − 1)n
) in the
second line (resp. in the penultimate line) since the vector has length n and δy is n − 1.
Coefficient in the other lines are similarly obtained and the proof is thus omitted.
We are then left to compute an approximation of the partial second order derivatives
∂2P
∂x2 ,
∂2P
∂y2 , and
∂2P
∂x∂y with the kernels, Ky
��
x2
, Ky��
y2
, and Ky��xy respectively. However, the size of
each of these kernels is varying from 3×3 to (2N+1)×(2N+1). Let us explain the approach
on the former partial derivative. The other can be immediately deduced.
Since the objective is to detect large variations, the second order derivative is approxi-
mated as the maximum of the approximations. More formally, let n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N, be an
integer number and
∂2P
∂x2 n
be the result of applying the Kernel Ky��
x2
of size (2n+1)× (2n+1).
The derivative
∂2P
∂x2 is defined by
∂2P
∂x2 = max
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
∂2P
∂x2 1
�
�
�
�
�
�
, . . . ,
�
�
�
�
�
�
∂2P
∂x2 N
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
. (4.1)
The same iterative approach is applied to compute approximations of
∂2P
∂y∂x and of
∂2P
∂y2 .
Next section studies the suitability of approximating second order derivatives when con-
sidering an image as a polynomial.
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4.4/ POLYNOMIAL INTERPOLATION OF IMAGES FOR HESSIAN MA-
TRIX COMPUTATION
Let P(x, y) be the discrete value of the pixel (x, y) in the image. Let n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N, be an
integer such that the objective is to find a polynomial interpolation on the (2n+1)× (2n+1)
window where the central pixel has index (0, 0). There exists an unique polynomial L :
R × R → R of degree (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) defined such that L(x, y) = P(x, y) for each pixel
(x, y) in this window. Such a polynomial is defined by
L(x, y) =
�n
i=−n
�n
j=−n
P(i, j)
�
�
−n≤ j�≤n
j�� j
x− j�
i− j�
�
�
�
−n≤i�≤n
i��i
x−i�
i−i�
�
(4.2)
It is not hard to prove that the first order horizontal derivative of the polynomial L(x, y) is
∂L
∂x =
�n
i=−n
�n
j=−n P(i, j)
�
�
−n≤ j�≤n
j�� j
y− j�
j− j�
�
�
�
−n≤i�≤n
i��i
1
i−i�
�
−n≤i��≤n
i���i,i�
x−i��
i−i��
� (4.3)
and thus to deduce that the second order ones are
∂2L
∂x2 =
�n
i=−n
�n
j=−n P(i, j)
�
�
−n≤ j�≤n
j�� j
y− j�
j− j�
�
�
�
−n≤i�≤n
i��i
1
i−i�
�
−n≤i��≤n
i���i,i�
1
i−i��
�
−n≤i���≤n
i����i,i�,i��
x−i���
i−i���
� (4.4)
∂2L
∂y∂x =
�n
i=−n P(i, j)
�
�
−n≤ j�≤n
j�� j
1
j− j�
�
−n≤ j��≤n
j��� j, j�
y− j��
j− j��
�
�
�
−n≤i�≤n
i��i
1
i−i�
�
−n≤i��≤n
i���i,i�
x−i��
i−i��
�
(4.5)
These second order derivatives are computed for each moving window and are associ-
ated to the central pixel, i.e., to the pixel (0, 0) inside this one.
Let us first simplify ∂
2L
∂x2 , defined in Equation (4.4), and when (x, y) = (0, 0). If j is not null,
the index j� is going to be null and the product
�
�
−n≤ j�≤n
j�� j
− j�
j− j�
�
is null too. In this equation,
we thus only consider j = 0. It is obvious that the product indexed with j� is thus equal to
1. This equation can thus be simplified in:
∂2L
∂x2 =
�n
i=−n P(i, 0)
�
�
−n≤i�≤n
i��i
1
i−i�
�
−n≤i��≤n
i���i,i�
1
i−i��
�
−n≤i���≤n
i����i,i�,i��
i���
i���−i
� (4.6)
and then in:
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∂2L
∂x2 =
�n
i=−n P(i, 0)
�
�
−n≤i�<i��≤n
i�,i���i
2
(i−i�)(i−i��)
�
−n≤i���≤n
i����i,i�,i��
i���
i���−i
�
.
(4.7)
From this equation, the kernel allowing to evaluate horizontal second order derivatives
can be computed for any n. It is further denoted as Ko��
x2
. Instances of such matrix when
n = 2, 3, and 4 are given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Kernels Ko��
x2
for second order horizontal derivatives induced by polynomial
interpolation
n Ko��
x2
2
�
−1
12
,
4
3
,
−5
2
,
4
3
−1
12
�
3
�
1
90
,
−3
20
,
3
2
,
−49
18
,
3
2
,
−3
20
,
1
90
�
4
�
−1
560
,
8
315
,
−1
5
,
8
5
,
−205
72
,
8
5
,
−1
5
,
8
315
,
−1
560
�
Table 4.4: Kernels for second order diagonal derivatives induced by polynomial interpo-
lation
n Ko��xy
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From Equation 4.5, kernels allowing to evaluate diagonal second order derivatives (i.e.,
∂2L
∂y∂x ) are computed. They are denoted as Ko
��
xy. Table 4.4 gives two examples of them
when n = 1 and n = 2. Notice that for n = 1, the kernel Ko��xy is equal to Kc
��
xy.
4.5/ DISTORTION COST
The distortion function has to associate to each pixel (i, j) the cost ρi j of its modification
by ±1.
The objective is to map a small value to a pixel when all its second order derivatives are
high and a large value otherwise. In WOW and UNIWARD the distortion function is based
on the Ho¨lder norm with
ρwi j =
�
�
�
�
�
ξhi j
�
�
�
�
p
+
�
�
�
�
ξvi j
�
�
�
�
p
+
�
�
�
�
ξdi j
�
�
�
�
p
�− 1
p
4.6. EXPERIMENTS 77
Scheme Stego. content Changes with cover
Ky based approach
Ko based approach
Fig. 4.1: Embedding changes instance with payload α = 0.4
where p is a negative number and ξh
i j
(resp. ξv
i j
and ξd
i j
) represents the horizontal (resp.
vertical and diagonal) suitability. A small suitability in one direction means an inaccurate
position to embed a message.
We propose here to adapt such a distortion cost as follows:
ρi j =
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
∂2P
∂x2 (i, j)
�
�
�
�
�
�
+
�
�
�
�
�
�
∂2P
∂y2 (i, j)
�
�
�
�
�
�
+
�
�
�
�
�
�
∂2P
∂y∂x (i, j)
�
�
�
�
�
�
�− 1
p
It is not hard to check that such a function has large values when at least one of its
derivatives is null. Otherwise, the larger the derivatives are, the smaller the returned
value is.
4.6/ EXPERIMENTS
First of all, the whole steganographic approach code is available online1.
Figure 4.1 presents the results of embedding data in a cover image from the BOSS con-
test database [75] with respect to the two second order derivative schemes presented in
this work. The Ky based approach (resp. the Ko based one) corresponds to the scheme
detailed in Section 4.3 (resp. in Section 4.4). The payload α is set to 0.4 and kernels are
computed with N = 4. The central column outputs the embedding result whereas the right
1https://github.com/stego-content/SOS
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one displays differences between the cover image and the stego one. It can be observed
that pixels in smooth area (the sky, the external access steps) and pixels in clean edges
(the columns, the step borders) are not modified by the approach. On the contrary, an
unpredictable area (a monument for example) concentrates pixel changes.
4.6.1/ CHOICE OF PARAMETERS
The two methods proposed in Section 4.3 and in Section 4.4 are based on kernels of size
up to (2N + 1) × (2N + 1). This section aims at finding the value of the N parameter that
maximizes the security level. For each approach, we have built 1,000 stego images with
N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 where the covers belong to the BOSS contest database.
This set contains 10,000 grayscale 512×512 images in a RAW format. The security of the
approach has been evaluated thanks to the Ensemble Classifier [57] based steganalyser,
which is considered as a state of the art steganalyser tool. This steganalysis process
embeds the rich model (SRM) features [30] of size 34,671. For a payload α, either equal
to 0.1 or to 0.4, average testing errors (expressed in percentages) have been studied and
are summarized in Table 4.5. Thanks to these experiments, we observe that the size
Table 4.5: Average Testing Errors with respect to the the Kernel Size
α
N
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Average testing 0.1 39 40.2 39.7 39.8 40.1 39.9 39.8
error for Kernel Ky 0.4 15 18.8 19.1 19.0 18.6 18.7 18.7
Average testing 0.1 35.2 36.6 36.7 36.6 37.1 37.2 37.2
error for Kernel Ko 0.4 5.2 6.8 7.5 7.9 8.1 8.2 7.6
N = 4 (respectively N = 12) obtains sufficiently large average testing errors for the Ky
based approach (resp. for the Ko based one). In what follows, these values are retained
for these two methods.
4.6.2/ SECURITY EVALUATION
As in the previous section, the BOSS contest database has been retained. To achieve
a complete comparison with other steganographic tools, the whole database of 10,000
images has been used. Ensemble Classifier with SRM features is again used to evaluate
the security of the approach.
We have chosen 4 different payloads, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, as in many steganographic
evaluations. Three values are systematically given for each experiment: the area under
the ROC curve (AUC), the average testing error (ATE), and the OOB error (OOB).
All the results are summarized in Table 4.6. Let us analyse these experimental results.
The security approach is often lower than those observed with state of the art tools:
for instance with payload α = 0.1, the most secure approach is WOW with an average
testing error equal to 0.43 whereas our approach reaches 0.38. However these results
are promising and for two reasons. First, our approaches give more resistance towards
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Ensemble Classifier (contrary to HUGO) for large payloads. Secondly, without any opti-
misation, our approach is not so far from state of the art steganographic tools. Finally,
we explain the lack of security of the Ko based approach with large payloads as follows:
second order derivatives are indeed directly extracted from polynomial interpolation. This
easy construction however induces large variations between the polynomial L and the
pixel function P.
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Table 4.6: Summary of experiments
Payload AUC ATE OOB
WOW 0.1 0.6501 0.4304 0.3974
0.2 0.7583 0.3613 0.3169
0.3 0.8355 0.2982 0.2488
0.4 0.8876 0.2449 0.1978
SUNIWARD 0.1 0.6542 0.4212 0.3972
0.2 0.7607 0.3493 0.3170
0.3 0.8390 0.2863 0.2511
0.4 0.8916 0.2319 0.1977
MVG 0.1 0.6340 0.4310 0.4124
0.2 0.7271 0.3726 0.3399
0.3 0.7962 0.3185 0.2858
0.4 0.8486 0.2719 0.2353
HUGO 0.1 0.6967 0.3982 0.3626
0.2 0.8012 0.3197 0.2847
0.3 0.8720 0.2557 0.2212
0.4 0.9517 0.1472 0.1230
Ky based approach 0.1 0.7378 0.3768 0.3306
0.2 0.8568 0.2839 0.2408
0.3 0.9176 0.2156 0.1710
0.4 0.9473 0.1638 0.1324
Ko based approach 0.1 0.6831 0.3696 0.3450
0.2 0.8524 0.1302 0.2408
0.3 0.9132 0.1023 0.1045
0.4 0.9890 0.0880 0.0570
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4.7/ THRESHOLD CHOICE
As we know, an edge is represented by a local maximum in gradient values (i.e., first
derivatives) and by a zero crossing in second derivatives. Edge points are detected by
finding the zero crossings of the second derivative of the image intensity, but this step
is very sensitive to noise. To counter this sensitivity in edge detection, it is desirable to
filter noise before edge detection. Threshold technique can be used to solve this problem
by focusing on regions of interest. The threshold can perform operation on the gradient
magnitudes and output a binary image, which is a matrix of Boolean values, to determine
the edge. Removing noise is relevant when detecting the edges in an image. Indeed,
well-known edge detectors like Sobel or Canny filters use smoothing filters for this reason.
Image thresholding is an usual task in the field of computer vision. The objective is here
to divide pixels of an image as either dark or light. The pixel is considered as an edge
location if f (x, y) exceeds threshold T . Edge detection scheme ignores all edges that are
not stronger than threshold. In this experiment the threshold technique is used to choose
the most important pixels, i.e., to compute the distortion map. After applying second
derivatives on the image, we got three images with horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
directions. The three images are depicted in Figure 4.2.
(a) Original image (b) Vertical kernel
(c) Horizontal kernel (d) Diagonal
Fig. 4.2: The filter result
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The three kernels emphasize the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal edges. These edges
are affected by the noise and the weak edges. It is thus hard to give correct description
of strong edges in each direction. The threshold method converts each kernel results
(vertical horizontal and diagonal) into a binary image according to threshold value. This
is done by separating the pixels into two regions according to the threshold value, and
then by chaining the values of 1 in a the binary image with the original value of the kernel.
This is clear in Figure 4.3.
(a) Vertical binary image (b) Horizontal binary image
(c) Diagonal binary image
Fig. 4.3: Threshold results
The choice of the initial threshold takes into consideration the minimum and the maximum
value in each kernel as in Equation 4.8.
Initial threshold =
min(Im value) + max(Im value)
2
(4.8)
The next threshold is computed as described in Equation 4.9.
Next threshold =
mean(Im value(Greater than threshold)) + mean(Im value(Less than threshold))
2
(4.9)
When applying this algorithm, we obtain a binary representation of the image; but, in
this case, the payload effect is removed. Algorithms 1 and 2 contain the full description
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of our technique, which is used to focus on the region of interest when applying the
second derivative schemes. The threshold algorithm is applied to each coefficient kernel
in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal direction. This scheme is applied to reduce the
number of weak edges and noise in each direction. The threshold process represents a
refinement operation to the coefficients in the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal kernels
that are produced by the second order derivative. The embedding process selects the
largest values in each direction, where we find the edge and noisy area. It preserves
the smallest values, that indicate smooth areas in which hidden messages are easy to
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predict. This formula has been used with 10,000 images from BOSS basis of images.
Algorithm 1: Threshold computing
Input: Image that results from the convolution between the kernel and cover image
(Hor-Ver-Diag):Image k
Output: The image that depends on the threshold value: Im
1 T ← 0.5 ∗ [min(Image k(:)) + max(Image k(:))]
2 Flag = f alse
3 while ∼ Flag do
4 g ← image k >= T
5 Tnext ← 0.5 ∗ [mean(Image k(g)) + mean(Image k(∼ g))]
6 Flag ← abs(T − Tnext) < 0.5
7 T = Tnext;
8 end
9 Im ← Image k >= T ;
10 Im result = replace(Im, Image k);
Algorithm 2: Replacement function
Input: The binary image outputted by Algorithm 1: Im, Image k
Output: Image containing values that are grater than the threshold: Im result
1 for i ← 1 to size(Im, 1) do
2 for i ← 1 to size(Im, 2) do
3 if Im(i, j) == 1 then
4 Im result(i, j) = Image k(i, j);
5 end
6 end
7 end
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Table 4.7 represents the result of the ensemble classifier with 10,000 images. It contains
the Area Under the Curve, the Average Testing Error, and the Out Of Bag error related
to this experiment. These results are compared with the methods in the state of the art,
represented in Table 4.6. We can seen that focusing on regions of interest using second
order derivatives gives a result near to the state of the art with a payload of 0.1.
Table 4.7: Summary of threshold experiments
AUC ATE OOB
Threshold experiment 0.6358 0.4360 0.4076
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the area under the curve after applying the threshold to the
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal kernels.
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Fig. 4.4: Result of the threshold experiment
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4.8/ CONCLUSION
The first contribution of this chapter is a distortion function that is based on second or-
der derivatives. These partial derivatives allow to accurately compute the level curves
and thus to look favorably on pixels without clean level curves. Two approaches to build
these derivatives have been proposed. The first one is based on revisiting kernels usu-
ally embedded in edge detection algorithms. The second one is based on the polynomial
approximation of the bitmap image. These two methods have been completely imple-
mented. The first experiments have shown that the security level is slightly lower than
the one of the most stringent approaches. These first promising results encourage us
to deeply investigate this direction. The last part of this chapter studies the embedding
in the chaotic regions. These regions are selected depending on the adaptive thresh-
old technique. The result of the threshold technique gives a reasonable level of security
towards ensemble classifier schemes.
III
CONCLUSION
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5CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
5.1/ CONCLUSION
In this manuscript, three main contributions related to the information hiding field of re-
search have been realized.
In the first contribution, we have studied various state of the art steganography methods
against many factors, to emphasize the gap between laboratory evaluations and the real-
ity. One of the main factors is the payload, on the sensibility of which ensemble classifier
was evaluated: nsF5, for instance, shows surprising results. The assessment of Ensem-
ble classifier was done according to changes in feature extraction. In the third parts, we
have focused on the group of images that is used during both training and testing stages.
For this first contribution, we have seen that the effectiveness of various steganalysis
system changes when their parameters are modified. Note that these tests have been
performed using Boss images and other ones that were taken from the Internet. It means
that standard and normal images were used in these experiments, and so they do not
have impacted the differences that have occurred.
In the second contribution, the focus was on the principle of Kerckhoff’s. In this experi-
ments, everything about the used steganography schemes without any information about
the key that is used in this algorithms is known in the steganalysis system. In this con-
tribution, the steganography method is changed in the training and testing stage but with
the same payload in these two stages. From the first results, we observed that the J-
UNIWARD and HUGO can be detected when we used the nsF5 in the training stage with
the same payload in the two stages.
In the second part of this work, more than one methods are used in the training and
the testing stage, but the payload is the same. The methods that are used in these
tests are nsF5, J-UNIWARD, and HUGO. All these tests are achieved with the objective
to build a universal steganalysis approach. In the third test, we evaluate the effect of
changing the payloads in the training stage and the testing stage. These tests were done
in two manners. The first one is when the same steganography scheme is used in the
training and testing stage but with different payloads. In the second one, the training and
the testing stage did not use the same embedding schemes: we changed the payloads
and the steganography method. From the result of these experiments, it is clear that
steganalysis can detect the presence of hidden messages in spite of the small payloads
that that have been considered here. The result of these tests are acceptable when using
steganography schemes with appropriate payloads in the training stage.
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In the third contribution, a new steganography method has been proposed. This
steganography scheme is dependent on level-curves in the image, where the noisy area
is more appropriate to embed secret messages. In this work, the search of the level-
curves and the way to compute the distortion function depend on the second derivative of
the image. Two derivatives were built, the first one revisiting kernels while the second one
depends on a polynomial approximation on the image. Boss images were used in this
contribution with different payloads. Assessment of the results was done by the Ensem-
ble classifier combined with the SRM features. The second part of this contribution was
depending on choosing more convenient regions in an image to embed a secret mes-
sage. Choosing these areas was achieved using threshold techniques, leading to more
acceptable results that are more close to the state of the art in steganography domain.
5.2/ PERSPECTIVES
The process of steganography and steganalysis in image domain are always in a state of
competition. This led to think about many choices to improve the work. We need first to
focus on internal factors, like edges in the image, that have effects on the steganography
scheme. These factors help to face steganalysis system. Sharpened to some edges in
images before the steganography method may lead to more resistance against steganal-
ysis system.
We plan to more deeply study which of the challenges can be won by steganalysis or
steganography. Many other steganography tools, classifiers, and feature extractions li-
braries will be considered. Finally, a theoretical framework will be proposed to rigorously
investigate new steganalysis challenges having steganography and steganalysis as pa-
rameters.
We plan to focus on other approaches to provide second order derivatives with larger
discrimination power. Then, the objective will be to deeply investigate whether the Holder
norm is optimal when the objective is to avoid null second order derivatives, and to give
priority to the largest second order values.
The huge computation of the features takes a long time and was made with the help of
the “Me´socentre de calcul de l’Universite´ de Franche-Comte´”. This reason leads us to
think about the field of dimensionality reduction of the features to fastly obtain results that
are more accurate to steganalysis systems.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Pinaki Acbarjya, Das Ritaban, and Dibyendu Ghoshal. A study on image edge de-
tection using the gradients. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publi-
cations, 2(12), 2012.
[2] Monika Agarwal. Text steganographic approaches: a comparison. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1302.2718, 2013.
[3] Hayat Al-Dmour and Ahmed Al-Ani. A steganography embedding method based on
edge identification and xor coding. Expert systems with Applications, 46:293–306,
2016.
[4] R Amirtharajan, R Akila, and P Deepikachowdavarapu. A comparative analysis of
image steganography. International journal of computer applications, 2(3):41–47,
2010.
[5] I˙smail Avcıbas¸, Mehdi Kharrazi, Nasir Memon, and Bu¨lent Sankur. Image steganal-
ysis with binary similarity measures. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal
Processing, 2005(17):1–9, 2005.
[6] Pedram Azad. Fundamentals of image processing. In Visual Perception for Manip-
ulation and Imitation in Humanoid Robots, pages 67–89. Springer, 2009.
[7] Leah Bar, Nir Sochen, and Nahum Kiryati. Image deblurring in the presence of
salt-and-pepper noise. In International Conference on Scale-Space Theories in
Computer Vision, pages 107–118. Springer, 2005.
[8] Johann Barbier, E´ric Filiol, and Kichenakoumar Mayoura. Universal jpeg steganal-
ysis in the compressed frequency domain. In International Workshop on Digital
Watermarking, pages 253–267. Springer, 2006.
[9] SS Bedi and Rati Khandelwal. Various image enhancement techniques-a critical
review. International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Communica-
tion Engineering, 2(3), 2013.
[10] Souvik Bhattacharyya. A survey of steganography and steganalysis technique in
image, text, audio and video as cover carrier. Journal of global research in computer
science, 2(4), 2011.
[11] Ahmad Bitar, Rony Darazi, Jean-Franc¸ois Couchot, and Raphae¨l Couturier. Blind
digital watermarking in pdf documents using spread transform dither modulation.
Multimedia Tools and Applications, *(*):***–***, 2015. accepted on 2015/10/21. To
appear.
[12] Om Pavithra Bonam and Sridhar Godavarthy. Edge detection. Computer Vision
(CAP 6415: Project 2)(University of South Florida, 2003), 2003.
91
92 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[13] Ajay Kumar Boyat and Brijendra Kumar Joshi. A review paper: Noise models in
digital image processing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.03489, 2015.
[14] Yambem Jina Chanu, Kh Manglem Singh, and Themrichon Tuithung. Image
steganography and steganalysis: A survey. International Journal of Computer Ap-
plications, 52(2), 2012.
[15] Abbas Cheddad, Joan Condell, Kevin Curran, and Paul Mc Kevitt. Digital im-
age steganography: Survey and analysis of current methods. Signal processing,
90(3):727–752, 2010.
[16] Abbas Cheddad, Joan Condell, Kevin Curran, and Paul Mc Kevitt. Digital im-
age steganography: Survey and analysis of current methods. Signal processing,
90(3):727–752, 2010.
[17] Rita Chhikara and Latika Singh. A review on digital image steganalysis techniques
categorised by features extracted. image, 3(4), 2013.
[18] Jean-Franc¸ois Couchot, Raphael Couturier, and Christophe Guyeux. Stabylo:
steganography with adaptive, bbs, and binary embedding at low cost. annals of
telecommunications-annales des te´le´communications, 70(9-10):441–449, 2015.
[19] Tomas Denemark, Vahid Sedighi, Vojtech Holub, Re´mi Cogranne, and Jessica
Fridrich. Selection-channel-aware rich model for steganalysis of digital images. In
2014 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS),
pages 48–53. IEEE, 2014.
[20] Kshetrimayum Jenita Devi. A Sesure Image Steganography Using LSB Tech-
nique and Pseudo Random Encoding Technique. PhD thesis, National Institute
of Technology-Rourkela, 2013.
[21] Nameer N. El-Emam and Mofleh Al-Diabat. A novel algorithm for colour image
steganography using a new intelligent technique based on three phases. Appl. Soft
Comput., 37:830–846, 2015.
[22] Vincenzo Ficarra, Giacomo Novara, Walter Artibani, Andrea Cestari, Antonio Gal-
fano, Markus Graefen, Giorgio Guazzoni, Bertrand Guillonneau, Mani Menon,
Francesco Montorsi, et al. Retropubic, laparoscopic, and robot-assisted radical
prostatectomy: a systematic review and cumulative analysis of comparative stud-
ies. European urology, 55(5):1037–1063, 2009.
[23] Tomas Filler and Jessica Fridrich. Gibbs construction in steganography. Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 5(4):705–720, 2010.
[24] Jessica Fridrich. Feature-based steganalysis for jpeg images and its implications for
future design of steganographic schemes. In International Workshop on Information
Hiding, pages 67–81. Springer, 2004.
[25] Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, and Rui Du. Reliable detection of lsb steganog-
raphy in color and grayscale images. In Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on
Multimedia and security: new challenges, pages 27–30. ACM, 2001.
[26] Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, and Dorin Hogea. Attacking the outguess. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Security, volume 2002. Juan-
les-Pins, France, 2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 93
[27] Jessica Fridrich and Jan Kodovsky. Rich models for steganalysis of digital images.
Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 7(3):868–882, 2012.
[28] Jessica Fridrich and Jan Kodovsky. Rich models for steganalysis of digital images.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7(3):868–882, 2012.
[29] Jessica Fridrich, Toma´sˇ Pevny`, and Jan Kodovsky`. Statistically undetectable jpeg
steganography: dead ends challenges, and opportunities. In Proceedings of the
9th workshop on Multimedia & security, pages 3–14. ACM, 2007.
[30] Jessica J. Fridrich and Jan Kodovsky´. Rich models for steganalysis of digital im-
ages. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7(3):868–882,
2012.
[31] Jessica J Fridrich and Jan Kodovsky`. Multivariate gaussian model for designing
additive distortion for steganography. In ICASSP, pages 2949–2953, 2013.
[32] Mukesh Garg and AP Gurudev Jangra. An overview of different type of data hid-
ing scheme in image using steganographic techniques. International Journal of
Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering, 4(1), 2014.
[33] Tina Gebreyohannes and Dong-Yoon Kim. Adaptive noise reduction scheme for
salt and pepper. arXiv preprint arXiv:1201.2050, 2012.
[34] Rafael C Gonzalez and Richard E Woods. Digital image processing. Nueva Jersey,
2008.
[35] Nagham Hamid, Abid Yahya, R Badlishah Ahmad, and Osamah M Al-Qershi. Image
steganography techniques: an overview. International Journal of Computer Science
and Security (IJCSS), 6(3):168–187, 2012.
[36] Ali K Hmood, Hamid A Jalab, ZM Kasirun, BB Zaidan, and AA Zaidan. On the ca-
pacity and security of steganography approaches: An overview. Journal of Applied
Sciences, 10:1825–1833, 2010.
[37] Vojteˇch Holub and Jessica Fridrich. Low-complexity features for jpeg steganalysis
using undecimated dct. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
10(2):219–228, 2015.
[38] Vojteˇch Holub, Jessica Fridrich, and Toma´sˇ Denemark. Random projections of
residuals as an alternative to co-occurrences in steganalysis. In IS&T/SPIE Elec-
tronic Imaging, pages 86650L–86650L. International Society for Optics and Pho-
tonics, 2013.
[39] Vojteˇch Holub, Jessica Fridrich, and Toma´sˇ Denemark. Universal distortion func-
tion for steganography in an arbitrary domain. EURASIP Journal on Information
Security, 2014(1):1–13, 2014.
[40] Vojteˇch Holub, Jessica Fridrich, and Toma´sˇ Denemark. Universal distortion func-
tion for steganography in an arbitrary domain. EURASIP Journal on Information
Security, 2014(1):1–13, 2014.
[41] Vojte´ch Holub and Jessica J Fridrich. Designing steganographic distortion using
directional filters. In WIFS, pages 234–239, 2012.
94 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[42] J Hossain. Information-hiding using image steganography with pseudorandom per-
mutation. Bangladesh Research Publications Journal, ISSN, 2003:215–225, 1998.
[43] Donghui HU, Lina WANG, Xiaqiu JIANG, Dengpan YE, and Shiguo LIAN. A specific
steganalysis approach to effective attacking the mb1. Chinese Journal of Electron-
ics, 18(4), 2009.
[44] Md. Rafiqul Islam, A. W. Naji, A. A. Zaidan, and B. B. Zaidan. New system for secure
cover file of hidden data in the image page within executable file using statistical
steganography techniques. CoRR, abs/1002.2416, 2010.
[45] Saiful Islam, Mangat Rai Modi, and Phalguni Gupta. Edge-based image steganog-
raphy. EURASIP J. Information Security, 2014:8, 2014.
[46] Matu´sˇ Jo´kay and Toma´sˇ Moravc´ı´k. Image-based jpeg steganography. Tatra Moun-
tains Mathematical Publications, 45(1):65–74, 2010.
[47] Mamta Juneja, Parvinder S Sandhu, and Ekta Walia. Application of lsb based
steganographic technique for 8-bit color images. World Academy of Science, Engi-
neering and Technology, 50:423–425, 2009.
[48] Geeta Kasana, Kulbir Singh, and Satvinder Singh Bhatia. Block-based high capac-
ity multilevel image steganography. Journal of Circuits, Systems, and Computers,
25(8):1–21, 2016.
[49] Gurmeet Kaur and Aarti Kochhar. Transform domain analysis of image steganog-
raphy. International Journal for Science and Emerging Technologies with Latest
Trends” 6 (1), pages 29–37, 2013.
[50] Stephen Mark Keating. Digital image enhancement, June 6 2000. US Patent
6,072,538.
[51] Oleg Kobylin and Vyacheslav Lyashenko. Comparison of standard image edge de-
tection techniques and of method based on wavelet transform. International Journal
of Advanced Research, 2(8):572–580, 2014.
[52] Jan Kodovsky`. Steganalysis of Digital Images Using Rich Image Representations
and Ensemble Classifiers. PhD thesis, State University of New York, 2012.
[53] Jan Kodovsky` and Jessica Fridrich. Calibration revisited. In Proceedings of the
11th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security, pages 63–74. ACM, 2009.
[54] Jan Kodovsky` and Jessica Fridrich. Steganalysis of jpeg images using rich models.
In IS&T/SPIE Electronic Imaging, pages 83030A–83030A. International Society for
Optics and Photonics, 2012.
[55] Jan Kodovsky, Jessica Fridrich, and Vojteˇch Holub. Ensemble classifiers for ste-
ganalysis of digital media. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Secu-
rity, 7(2):432–444, 2012.
[56] Jan Kodovsky, Jessica Fridrich, and Vojtech Holub. Ensemble classifiers for ste-
ganalysis of digital media. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on, 7(2):432–444, 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 95
[57] Jan Kodovsky´, Jessica J. Fridrich, and Vojtech Holub. Ensemble classifiers for
steganalysis of digital media. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Se-
curity, 7(2):432–444, 2012.
[58] Jan Kodovsky`, Toma´sˇ Pevny`, and Jessica Fridrich. Modern steganalysis can de-
tect yass. In IS&T/SPIE Electronic Imaging, pages 754102–754102. International
Society for Optics and Photonics, 2010.
[59] Kanika Lakhani, Bhawna Minocha, and Neeraj Gugnani. Analyzing edge detection
techniques for feature extraction in dental radiographs. Perspectives in Science,
2016.
[60] Chin-Feng Lee, Yi-Ren Wang, and Chin-Chen Chang. A steganographic method
with high embedding capacity by improving exploiting modification direction. In In-
telligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, 2007. IIHMSP 2007.
Third International Conference on, volume 1, pages 497–500. IEEE, 2007.
[61] James K Lein. Fundamentals of image processing. In Environmental Sensing,
pages 83–109. Springer, 2012.
[62] Bin Li, Junhui He, Jiwu Huang, and Yun Qing Shi. A survey on image steganog-
raphy and steganalysis. Journal of Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Pro-
cessing, 2(2):142–172, 2011.
[63] Bo Li, Aleksandar Jevtic, Ulrik So¨derstro¨m, Shafiq Ur Re´hman, and Haibo Li. Fast
edge detection by center of mass. In The 1st IEEE/IIAE International Conference
on Intelligent Systems and Image Processing 2013 (ICISIP2013), pages 103–110,
2013.
[64] Jiu-fen Liu, Yu-guo Tian, Tao Han, Junchao Wang, and Xiangyang Luo. Stego
key searching for LSB steganography on JPEG decompressed image. SCIENCE
CHINA Information Sciences, 59(3):32105:1–32105:15, 2016.
[65] Weiqi Luo, Fangjun Huang, and Jiwu Huang. Edge adaptive image steganography
based on lsb matching revisited. IEEE Transactions on information forensics and
security, 5(2):201–214, 2010.
[66] Raman Maini and Himanshu Aggarwal. Study and comparison of various image
edge detection techniques. International journal of image processing (IJIP), 3(1):1–
11, 2009.
[67] Raman Maini and Himanshu Aggarwal. A comprehensive review of image enhance-
ment techniques. arXiv preprint arXiv:1003.4053, 2010.
[68] Aziz Makandar and Bhagirathi Halalli. Image enhancement techniques using high-
pass and lowpass filters. International Journal of Computer Applications, 109(14),
2015.
[69] Yoan Miche. Developing fast machine learning techniques with applications to ste-
ganalysis problems. PhD thesis, Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble-INPG,
2010.
[70] R Muthukrishnan and M Radha. Edge detection techniques for image segmen-
tation. International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology,
3(6):259, 2011.
96 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[71] Hideki Noda, Michiharu Niimi, and Eiji Kawaguchi. High-performance jpeg
steganography using quantization index modulation in dct domain. Pattern Recog-
nition Letters, 27(5):455–461, 2006.
[72] Komal Patel, Sumit Utareja, and Hitesh Gupta. Information hiding using least signif-
icant bit steganography and blowfish algorithm. International Journal of Computer
Applications, 63(13), 2013.
[73] Pritesh Pathak and S Selvakumar. Blind image steganalysis of jpeg images using
feature extraction through the process of dilation. Digital Investigation, 11(1):67–77,
2014.
[74] Toma´sˇ Pevny, Patrick Bas, and Jessica Fridrich. Steganalysis by subtractive
pixel adjacency matrix. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
5(2):215–224, 2010.
[75] Toma´s Pevny´, Toma´s Filler, and Patrick Bas. Break our steganographic system,
2010. Available at http://www.agents.cz/boss/.
[76] Tomas Pevny and Jessica Fridrich. Merging markov and dct features for multi-class
jpeg steganalysis. In Electronic Imaging 2007, pages 650503–650503. Interna-
tional Society for Optics and Photonics, 2007.
[77] Ioannis Pitas. Digital image processing algorithms and applications. John Wiley &
Sons, 2000.
[78] Sobel Prewitt. Scharr gradient 5x5 convolution matrices guennadi (henry) levkine
email: hlevkin at yahoo. com vancouver, canada. First draft, February, 2011.
[79] Niels Provos. Defending against statistical steganalysis. In Usenix security sympo-
sium, volume 10, pages 323–336, 2001.
[80] Kazem Qazanfari and Reza Safabakhsh. A new steganography method which
preserves histogram: Generalization of lsb++. Information Sciences, 277:90–101,
2014.
[81] M Indra Sena Reddy and AP Siva Kumar. Secured data transmission using wavelet
based steganography and cryptography by using aes algorithm. Procedia Com-
puter Science, 85:62–69, 2016.
[82] Sumanth Sakkara, DH Akkamahadevi, K Somashekar, and K Raghu. Integer
wavelet based secret data hiding by selecting variable bit length. International Jour-
nal of Computer Applications, 48(19):7–11, 2012.
[83] S Abdul Saleem and T Abdul Razak. Survey on color image enhancement tech-
niques using spatial filtering. International Journal of Computer Applications, 94(9),
2014.
[84] Phil Sallee. Model-based steganography. In International workshop on digital wa-
termarking, pages 154–167. Springer, 2003.
[85] Shubhashree Savant. A review on edge detection techniques for image segmenta-
tion. Int. J. Comp. Sci. Inform. Technol, 5(4):5898–5900, 2014.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 97
[86] HK Sawant and Mahentra Deore. A comprehensive review of image enhancement
techniques. International Journal of Computer Technology and Electronics Engi-
neering (IJCTEE), 1(2):39–44, 2010.
[87] Andre Schmeißer, Raimund Wegener, Dietmar Hietel, and Hans Hagen. Smooth
convolution-based distance functions. Graphical Models, 82:67–76, 2015.
[88] N Senthilkumaran and R Rajesh. Edge detection techniques for image
segmentation–a survey of soft computing approaches. International journal of re-
cent trends in engineering, 1(2), 2009.
[89] Mahdi Setayesh, Mengjie Zhang, and Mark Johnston. Detection of continuous,
smooth and thin edges in noisy images using constrained particle swarm optimi-
sation. In Proceedings of the 13th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary
computation, pages 45–52. ACM, 2011.
[90] Janvi Shah, Nupoor Patel, Hiral Tandel, Neelam Soni, and Ghanshyam I Prajapati.
A hybrid approach for edge detection using fuzzy logic and canny method. Interna-
tional Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT), 2(3), 2013.
[91] Pooja Sharma, Gurpreet Singh, and Amandeep Kaur. Different techniques of edge
detection in digital image processing. International Journal of Engineering research
and Applications, 3(3):458–461, 2013.
[92] Falesh M Shelke, Ashwini A Dongre, and Pravin D Soni. Comparison of different
techniques for steganography in images. International Journal of Application or
Innovation in Engineering & Management, 3(2), 2014.
[93] K Sathish Shet, AR Aswath, et al. Image steganography using integer wavelet
transform based on color space approach. In Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Frontiers of Intelligent Computing: Theory and Applications (FICTA)
2014, pages 839–848. Springer, 2015.
[94] Kaushal Solanki, Kenneth Sullivan, Upamanyu Madhow, BS Manjunath, and Shiv-
kumar Chandrasekaran. Statistical restoration for robust and secure steganogra-
phy. In IEEE International Conference on Image Processing 2005, volume 2, pages
II–1118. IEEE, 2005.
[95] Chris Solomon and Toby Breckon. Fundamentals of Digital Image Processing: A
practical approach with examples in Matlab. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[96] GS Sravanthi, Mrs B Sunitha Devi, SM Riyazoddin, and M Janga Reddy. A spatial
domain image steganography technique based on plane bit substitution method.
Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Graphics & Vision, 12 (15),
2012.
[97] Jean-Luc Starck, Fionn D Murtagh, and Albert Bijaoui. Image processing and data
analysis: the multiscale approach. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[98] High Capacity Despite Better Steganalysis and Andreas Westfeld. F5—a stegano-
graphic algorithm. In Information Hiding: 4th International Workshop, IH 2001, Pitts-
burgh, PA, USA, April 25-27, 2001. Proceedings, volume 2137, page 289. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2001.
98 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[99] C. P. Sumathi, T. Santhanam, and G. Umamaheswari. A study of various stegano-
graphic techniques used for information hiding. CoRR, abs/1401.5561, 2014.
[100] TK Thivakaran and RM Chandrasekaran. Nonlinear filter based image denoising
using amf approach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1003.1803, 2010.
[101] Scott E Umbaugh. Computer imaging: digital image analysis and processing. CRC
press, 2005.
[102] D Upham. Steganographic algorithm jsteg. Software available at http://zooid. org/˜
paul/crypto/jsteg, 1993.
[103] Rohit Verma and Dr Jahid Ali. A comparative study of various types of image noise
and efficient noise removal techniques. International journal of advanced research
in computer science and software engineering, 3(10):617–622, 2013.
[104] Brian A Wandell, Abbas El Gamal, and Bernd Girod. Common principles of image
acquisition systems and biological vision. Proceedings of the IEEE, 90(1):5–17,
2002.
[105] Andreas Westfeld and Andreas Pfitzmann. Attacks on steganographic systems. In
International workshop on information hiding, pages 61–76. Springer, 1999.
[106] Zhihua Xia, Lincong Yang, Xingming Sun, Wei Liang, Decai Sun, and Zhiqiang
Ruan. A learning-based steganalytic method against lsb matching steganography.
Radioengineering, 20(1):102–109, 2011.
[107] Peng Xu and Haisong Xu. Filter selection based on representative training samples
for multispectral imaging. Optik-International Journal for Light and Electron Optics,
127(20):9743–9754, 2016.
[108] Jing Zheng, Su-ping Peng, and Feng Yang. A novel edge detection for buried
target extraction after svd-2d wavelet processing. Journal of Applied Geophysics,
106:106–113, 2014.
[109] Han Zong, Fen-lin Liu, and Xiang-yang Luo. Blind image steganalysis based on
wavelet coefficient correlation. Digital Investigation, 9(1):58–68, 2012.
Document generated with LATEX and:
the LATEX style for PhD Thesis created by S. Galland — http://www.multiagent.fr/ThesisStyle
the tex-upmethodology package suite — http://www.arakhne.org/tex-upmethodology/
Abstract:
In the recent time, the field of image steganalysis and steganography became more important due
to the development in the Internet domain. It is important to keep in mind that the whole process of
steganography and steganalysis can be used for legal or illegal operations like any other applications.
The work in this thesis can be divided inthree parts. The first one concentrates on parameters that
increase the security of steganography methods against steganalysis techniques. In this contribution
the effect of the payload, feature extractions, and group of images that are used in the learning stage
and testing stage for the steganalysis system are studied. From simulation, we note that the state
of the art steganalyzer fails to detect the presence of a secret message when some parameters are
changed. In the second part, we study how the presence of many steganography methods may
influence the detection of a secret message. The work takes into consideration that there is no
ideal situation to embed a secret message when the steganographier can use any scheme with any
payloads. In the third part, we propose a method to compute an accurate distortion map depending
on a second order derivative of the image. The second order derivative is used to compute the level
curve and to embed the message on pixels outside clean level curves. The results of embedding a
secret message with our method demonstrate that the result is acceptable according to state of the
art steganography.
Keywords: Steganography, Stegananlysis, information security.
Re´sume´ :
De nos jours, le de´veloppement de la steganalyse et la ste´ganographie est incontournable, et peut
eˆtre utilise´ a` des fins le´gales comme ille´gales, comme dans toute autre application. Le travail
pre´sente´ dans cette the`se, se concentrant sur ces questions, est divise´ en trois parties. La premie`re
partie concerne les parame`tres permettant d’accroıˆtre le niveau de se´curite´ de la ste´ganographie
afin de faire face aux techniques de steganalyse. La contribution apporte´e dans cette premie`re
partie concerne l’e´tude de l’effet de la charge utile, l’extraction des caracte´ristiques, ainsi que
le groupe d’images utilise´s dans la phase d’apprentissage et la phase de test. Les re´sultats
des simulations montrent que les techniques de steganalyse de l’e´tat de l’art e´chouent dans la
detection des messages secrets inte´gre´s dans les images quand les parame`tres changent entre
l’apprentissage et le test. Dans la deuxie`me partie, nous e´tudions l’impact de la combinaison de
plusieurs me´thodes ste´ganographiques sur la de´tection des messages secrets. Ce travail prend en
conside´ration qu’il n’existe pas une procedure ide´ale, mais que le steganographieur pourra utiliser
n’importe quel sche´ma ainsi que n’importe quel taux d’embarquement. Dans la troisie`me et dernie`re
partie, on propose une me´thode qui calcule une carte de distorsion pre´cise, en fonction de la de´rive´e
seconde de l’image. La de´rive´e seconde est utilise´e afin de calculer les courbes de niveau, ensuite
le message va eˆtre cache´ dans l’image en e´cartant les courbes de niveaux infe´rieurs a` un certain
seuil. Les re´sultats expe´rimentaux de´montrent que le niveau de se´curite´ est acceptable compare´ aux
me´thodes ste´ganographiques de l’e´tat de l’art.
Mots-cle´s : Ste´ganographie, steganalyse, se´curite´ informatique.
